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As a founding principle of the European Union (“EU”), a prerequisite 
for the exercise of most other EU rights, and a key component of EU 
integration, the freedom of movement right has carried great political and 
practical importance. It has also been one of the most contested, 
politically abused, and poorly understood of EU rights, particularly in the 
context of mobility of nationals from Central and Eastern Europe 
(“CEE”). Notably, misinformation regarding the free movement right 
was spread by the media, politicians, and the public, which helped to 
propel both the UK’s renegotiation of its EU membership and, 
ultimately, its exit from the Union (“Brexit”). Other EU-15 State 
politicians have also been perpetuating myths about freedom of 
movement and immigration. Scholars addressing free movement, even in 
the context of Brexit, have devoted little attention to this right’s 
conceptualization as it has evolved over time, to how EU branches other 
than the European Court of Justice have approached it, or to how CEE 
nationals have been positioned and impacted by mobility’s legal 
framework. Although some critical scholars have critiqued derogations 
from the free movement right imposed on CEE nationals in the aftermath 
of their States’ accession to the EU, they have also failed to situate their 
analysis within a broader look at the creation and application of the legal 
framework behind mobility.  CEE movers in the UK and other EU-15 
States have tended to be racialized by the media, politicians, and the 
public – that is, described and approached by individuals and institutions 
in ways which denigrate or assume their inferiority. Hence, several tenets 
of critical race theory (“CRT”) and critical whiteness studies (“CWS”) 
that expound the relationship between race, power, society, and law are 
helpful to the analysis of their mobility.  
This Article argues that the freedom of movement right has always 
been limited, and that CEE nationals’ mobility rights have been 
especially restricted by both EU statutes and case law and further 
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impeded by restrictive Member State policies. Ultimately, the right of 
free movement has been created and consistently applied in a way as to 
benefit EU-15 States’ economies, while approaching CEE movers as 
mere units of production. This broader understanding of this right is 
necessary to make Brexit negotiations more meaningful, and debates 
about intra-EU movers in other EU-15 States more responsible. 
Moreover, the discussion here also critiques CRT and CWS for 
overlooking the significance of immigrant background and of white 
minority ethnicities in the conceptualization and experience of equality. 
This article suggests that both theoretical frameworks need to not only 
look beyond the black-white binary, but also consider contemporary 
transnational power dynamics to arrive at a more flexible and nuanced 
picture of micro-level racial and ethnic power relations in today’s 
globalized world. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION  
Soon after its inclusion in Spaak’s 1956 blueprint for the 
establishment of the European Common Market,1 freedom of movement 
of persons became widely regarded as a central aspect of the European 
integration project.2 As a prerequisite for the exercise of most other EU 
rights3 (including the right to equality) and a tangible symbol of EU 
integration, the right carries great social, economic, and political 
importance.4 Mobility has been proclaimed to be a fundamental right, a 
founding principle, and a core right of EU citizenship by the European 
Commission (the “Commission”),5 the European Parliament,6 the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (the “ECJ”),7 and key EU 
representatives.8 As revealed through Eurobarometer surveys, the public 
also considers it to be one of the most prized EU achievements.9 Western 
  
 1. Intergovernmental Comm. on European Integration, The Brussels Report on 
the General Common Market (Referred to as the Spaak Report), 1 (June 1965). 
 2. Michael Johns, Post-Accession Polish Migrants in Britain and Ireland: 
Challenges and Obstacles to Integration in the European Union, 15 EUR. J. MIGRATION 
& L. 29–45 (2013) https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ejml15&i=33. 
 3. Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, & Jacquet 
v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R I-3182. 
 4. See CAMINO MORTERA-MARTINEZ & CHRISTIAN ODENDAHL, WHAT FREE 
MOVEMENT MEANS TO EUROPE AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR BRITAIN (2017). 
 5. Commission Communication on Guidance for Better Transposition and 
Application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their 
Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, 
at 3, COM (2009) 313 final (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter European Commission]. 
 6. See, e.g., Resolution on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the 
European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7 TA0587 (2011). 
 7. See, e.g., Case C-413/99 Baumbast v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
2002 E.C.R. I-7136. 
 8. See, e.g., Viviane Reding, Vice-President of European Commission, Justice 
Commissioner, Address at the Conference for Mayors on EU Mobility at Local Level: 
Free Movement of EU Citizens: turning challenges into opportunities at local level (Feb. 
11, 2014). 
 9. They majority of EU citizens considers it to be the main EU right and the 
aspect of the EU most important to them personally. See European Comm’n, Report on 
European Union Citizenship, at 29–37, Flash Eurobarometer 365 (Feb. 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_365_en.pdf; European 
Comm’n, Public Opinion in the European Union: Report, at 64, Standard Eurobarometer 
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Member State (“EU-15”)10 nationals have strongly supported unrestricted 
mobility among EU-15 States.11 For example, in 1986, 74% supported an 
unlimited right to reside in all other EU-15 States.12 After the 2004 
accession of A-8 States13 and the 2007 accession of A-2 States14 of ten 
Central and East European (“CEE”) countries (collectively, the “Eastern 
Enlargement”),15 almost 90% of EU citizens polled considered mobility 
to be a fundamental right of their EU citizenship.16 A majority of those 
polled in 2013 described it as the core EU right,17 and the most positive 
achievement of the EU.18  
In 2014, fourteen million EU nationals relied on their right to reside in 
other Member States.19 Driven by employment opportunities and large 
  
79 (May 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_publ_en.pdf. 
 10. “EU-15” is considered the fifteen Member States before 2004: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Glossary of Statistical 
Terms: EU15, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6805, (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 11. See Commission of the European Communities, Public Opinion of the 
European Community, EURO-BAROMETRE No. 26 (Dec. 1986), 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb26/eb26_en.pdf. 
 12. Id. 
 13. “A-8” refers to Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia; Malta and Cyprus were also included in the 2004 enlargement. 
Saara Koikkalainen, Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST. (Apr. 21, 2011).
 
 14. The A-2 states comprised of Bulgaria and Romania. Id. 
 15. Commission Communication on the Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges, at 2, COM (2006) 649 final (Nov. 08, 2006). Both the European Council and 
the Commission consider the 2007 enlargement to have constituted the second wave of 
the 2004 enlargement. See generally id. 
 16. See generally European Comm’n, Report on European Union Citizenship, at 
4, Flash Eurobarometer 365 (Feb. 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_365_en.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. European Comm’n, First Results on Public Opinion in the European Union, 
at 8, Standard Eurobarometer 79 (July 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdf. 
 19. European Commission Memo 14/9, European Commission Upholds Free 
Movement of People, at 1 (Jan. 15, 2014).  
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gaps in earnings,20 post-2004 mobility has been predominantly from CEE 
to EU-15 States, with the largest group of movers being from Romania 
and Poland.21  
Despite—or due to—its conceptual and practical significance, 
mobility has been a controversial concept at times. It was one of the most 
contested topics during the Eastern Enlargement process, unpopular 
among EU-15 citizenry and officials.22 As far back as 1991, 63% of EU-
15 citizens polled had wished to restrict potential future CEE migration, 
and 20% desired to ban it altogether.23 On the eve of the Enlargement, 
16% of EU-15 citizens considered immigration to be a ‘major’ issue 
facing their countries - at par with terrorism, and rising prices. 
24
 
Allegedly fearing welfare tourism (although studies indicated that such 
concerns were not warranted),25 EU-15 States adamantly opposed an 
immediate post-accession access to free movement and to social benefits 
by CEE nationals.26 Despite CEE politicians’ objections, temporary 
restrictions on CEE workers’ free movement were included in both 
  
 20. Mikkel Barslund & Matthias Busse, Forum: Labour Mobility in the EU: 
Dynamics, Patterns and Policies, 3 INTERECONOMICS 116, 117 (2014). 
 21. European Job Mobility Lab., Mobility in Europe 2011, at 66–71 (Nov. 2011), 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13341&langId=en; Koikkalainen, supra note 13; 
Fries-Tersch et. al., 2017 Annual Rep. on Intra-EU Labour Mobility: Final Report Jan. 
2018, at 31 (Jan. 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/2017_report_on_intra-
eu_labour_mobility.pdf.    
 22. SAMANTHA CURRIE, MIGRATION, WORK AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENLARGED 
EUROPEAN UNION CH. 2 (2016); see generally Michael Haynes, European Union and Its 
Periphery: Inclusion and Exclusion, 33 ECON. AND POL. WEEKLY PE87 (1998). 
 23. Comm’n of the European Communities, Public Opinion in the European 
Community, at 42, Eurobarometer 35 (June 1991), 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb35/eb35_en.pdf. 
 24. European Comm’n, Eurobarometer Spring 2004: Public Opinion in the 
European Union, at 22, Joint Full Report of Eurobarometer 61 And CC Eurobarometer 
2004.1 (July 2004), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf. 
 25. Jon Kvist, Does EU enlargement start a race to the bottom? Strategic 
interaction among EU member states in social policy, 14(3) J. OF EUR. SOC. POL’Y 301, 
301 (2004); Michael Dougan, A Spectre is Haunting Europe … Free of Movement of 
Persons and the Eastern Enlargement, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 111-41 
(Chrisophe Hillion ed., 2004). 
 26. AGNIESZKA KUBAL, SOCIO-LEGAL INTEGRATION: POLISH POST-2004 EU 
ENLARGEMENT MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 74 (2012). 
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accession treaties – imposed on CEE states acceding in 2004 until April 
2011 –  and on those acceding in 2007 until December 2013.27  
When transitional limitations came to an end, renewed popular and 
political debates about “benefit tourism” and “poverty immigration” 
spread across EU-15 States.28 In a 2011 Eurobarometer survey, the 
majority of nationals in every EU-15 State other than Sweden and 
Luxembourg agreed with the statement that the internal market had 
“flooded” their country with “cheap labour.”29 Moreover, the 2008 
economic crisis fueled Eurosceptic populist discourse condemning the 
freedom of movement right and increasingly incorrectly labelling intra-
EU movers (especially from CEE states) as “migrants”30 and 
“foreigners.”31 Poles, Bulgarians, and Romanians have been especially 
targeted.32 In a 2013 letter to the President of the European Council for 
Justice and Home Affairs, Ministers representing Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom called for limitations on mobility 
  
 27. See Kubal, supra note 26, at 74–76; European Comm’n, Rep. on Transitional 
Arrangements Regarding Free Movement of Workers from Bulgaria and Romania, 
MEMO/11/773 (Nov. 11, 2011). Restrictions on the mobility of nationals from Cyprus 
and Malta, which had replaced Bulgaria and Romania in the accession negotiation 
process, were never even considered – likely due to their small populations. See Kubal, 
supra note 26, at 77–78. 
 28. Béla Galgóczi et al., Intra-EU labour migration: flows, effects and policy 
responses 5 (Eur. Trade Union Inst., Working Paper No. 2009.03, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264049;  
see also Eva-Maria Poptcheva, Freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens: 
Access to social benefits, at 3, European Parliamentary Research Serv. (2014), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140808/LDM_BRI(2
014)140808_REV1_EN.pdf. 
 29. See generally European Comm’n, Report of the Internal Market: Awareness, 
Perceptions and Impacts, at 18, Special Eurobarometer 363 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter 
Eurobarometer 2011]. 
 30. Synonymous with the American term “immigrants.” 
 31. Theodora Kostakopoulou, Mobility, Citizenship and Migration in a Post-
Crisis Europe, IMAGINING EUR. at 5 (June 2014), 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/imaginingeurope_09.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., Iwona Sobis et al., Polish plumbers and Romanian strawberry 
pickers: how the populist framing of EU migration impacts national policies, 5 
MIGRATION & DEV. 431, 436 (2016). 
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of “immigrants” from other EU States due to CEE movers’ alleged abuse 
and strain on the social systems of “benefit magnet” Member States.33   
From early 2000s, UK debates about its EU membership became 
conflated with mobility and immigration issues.34 As part of the UK’s 
membership renegotiation, Prime Minister David Cameron sought to 
decrease mobility into the UK, or at least EU citizens’ welfare access, 
even by economically active movers.35 The British public’s support for 
the UK’s “New Settlement” with the EU focused on restricting EU 
movers’ access to benefits.36 Concerns regarding free movement, and 
especially CEE workers’ mobility and their access to benefits, ultimately 
played a key part during the Brexit campaign and its outcome.37  
The conflation of EU membership, free movement right, and 
immigration by the media, politicians, and the public—during both the 
renegotiation process and the Brexit campaign—has been based on 
several inaccuracies. Central among them were the misconceptions that 
the ECJ had been overstretching Treaty38 provisions and secondary laws 
on free movement rights,39 that Member States have little discretion to 
  
 33. See Letter from Johanna Miki-Leitner, Fed. Minster of the Interior, Austria, 
et. al., to Alan Shatter, President, European Council for Justice & Home Affairs (2013) 
http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-130415lettertopresidencyfinal12.pdf. 
 34. James Dennison & Andrew Geddes, Brexit and the perils of ‘Europeanised’ 
migration, 25 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1137, 1141 (2018). 
 35. European Parliament, The UK’s ‘new settlement’ in the European Union: 
Renegotiation and referendum, THINK TANK (Feb. 25, 2016) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2016)577983. 
 36. Id.; Eiko Thielemann & Daniel Schade, Buying into Myths: Free Movement 
of People and Immigration, 87 Pol. Q. 139, 140 (2016). 
 37. See generally MORTERA-MARTINEZ & ODENDAHL, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 38. Unless otherwise indicated, “Treaty”, as used throughout this Article, refers 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and, after 1993, to the Treaty on 
European Union, including their amendments. 
 39. Id. at 3. Cameron himself incorrectly noted in his letter to Donald Tusk, 
President of the European Council, that ECJ had widened the scope of free movement 
beyond its statutory limitations. See Letter from David Cameron, the Prime Minister, 
U.K., to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council (Nov. 10, 2015), 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf. 
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affect movers’ access to welfare benefits,40 and that movers choose 
where to move based on the attractiveness of host States’ welfare 
benefits, adversely affecting host economies.41 Such misinformation has 
not been confined to the UK; other EU-15 State politicians have been 
perpetuating similar myths.42  
More generally, the freedom of movement right has been “legally 
over-complicated, politically abused, . . . and popularly 
misunderstood.”43 As Barnard and Butlin note, there is a need for “a 
radical rethink of the free movement of persons provisions.”44 It is 
crucial to better understand this right, especially in the context of CEE 
movers, to allow for more meaningful Brexit negotiations and their 
aftermath, as well as for a more responsible approach toward intra-EU 
immigrants in other EU-15 States, to which their mobility will continue 
after Brexit, and where anti-immigrant discourse and policies have been 
gathering strength.45 
Since the Brexit referendum, scholars have devoted more attention to 
free movement law and debates, but only to legal developments during 
the last two decades. For example, Currie,46 Dougan,47 and O’Brien48 
  
 40. Samantha Currie, Reflecting on Brexit: migration myths and what comes next 
for EU migrants in the UK?, 38 J. OF SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 337, 338 (2016) 
[hereinafter Reflecting on Brexit]; Charlotte O’Brien, Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the 
New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 937, 
937–978 (2016). 
 41. Thielemann & Schade, supra note 36, at 142. 
 42. Id.; see also Poptcheva, supra note 28. 
 43. Jo Shaw, Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, EU 
Free Movement Rules and National Immigration Law 17 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (Research Paper Series No. 2015/28, 2015) (quoting Editorial 
Comments, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Salvaging the Dream 
While Explaining the Nightmare, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 729, 736 (2014)). 
 44. Catherine Barnard & Sarah Butlin, Free Movement vs. Fair Movement: 
Brexit and Managed Migration, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 203, 205 (2018). 
 45. See, e.g., Eberl et. al., The European Media Discourse on Immigration and its 
Effects: A Literature Review, 42 ANNALS INT’L COMM. ASS’N 207 (2018); Sertan Akbaba, 
Re-narrating Europe in the Face of Populism: An Analysis of the Anti-immigration 
Discourse of Populist Party Leaders, 20 INSIGHT TURK. 199 (2018). 
 46. Reflecting on Brexit, supra note 40, at 338. 
 47. See generally Michael Dougan, The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the 
Legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free Movement of Union Citizens, in JUDGING 
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have pointed out that, over the last decade, the ECJ has been decreasing 
movers’ entitlements and tolerating increasing Member State discretion 
in doing so as well (most notably, through the imposition of national 
right-to-reside rules, and more demanding tests for what constitutes 
“work” and what constitutes “jobseeker” status from which worker 
protections stem).49 Others have emphasized the importance of public 
opposition to free movement to the referendum outcome.50 Some authors 
have noted that historically, the right to free movement has always been 
limited via statutes and case law, but they have not considered how 
actual movers have been affected by them. 51  
Outside of the Brexit context, similarly little attention has been 
devoted to this right’s conceptualization as it has evolved over time, to 
how EU branches other than the ECJ have approached it, or to how CEE 
nationals have been positioned and impacted by it. Detailed academic 
analyses of the right to free movement have traditionally focused on 
black letter law at specific moments in time,52 and more recently, on the 
  
EUROPE’S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 127–154 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013). 
 48. See generally O’Brien, supra note 40, at 940. 
 49. See generally Charlotte O’Brien et al., Comparative Report 2015 on the 
concept of worker under Article 45 TEFEU and certain non-standard forms of 
employment, at 8–9, FreSsco (April 2015), 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk/18690/1/18690.pdf?DDC72+DDC71+DDD19+dla0es+d700tmt. 
Both the 2015 FreSsco study and the ongoing EU Rights Project have documented that 
some Member States have increasingly been treating even movers who are not 
economically inactive as such, placing heavy burdens on workers to prove their 
entitlement to worker status, and designating work as “marginal and ancillary” (and thus 
not leading to worker status) simply due to being based on temporary contracts. Id.; see 
also Introducing the EU rights project, EU RTS. PROJECT (July 10, 2017), 
www.eurightsproject.co.uk.  
 50. Dennison & Geddes, supra note 34, at 1140–41; Thielemann & Schade, 
supra note 36, at 139–41. 
 51. See generally Barnard & Butlin, supra note 44, at 219–20; Michael Doherty, 
Through the Looking Glass: Brexit, Free Movement and the Future, 27 KING’S L.J. 375, 
376–77 (2016). 
 52. See, e.g., CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS (4th ed. 2013); DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS ( 3rd ed. 2014); PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES, 
AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2015); FRANCESCO ROSSI DAL POZZO, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2013); PEDRO CARO DE SOUSA, THE 
EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH (2015); NIGEL FOSTER, 
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ECJ’s approach toward access to social benefits by mobile individuals.53 
Although some scholars have pointed out tensions between EU and 
Member State approaches toward free movement,54 and internal tensions 
in the EU’s free movement law,55 little academic attention has been paid 
to the evolution of such challenges over time, and to CEE movers’ 
position. The one notable textbook that traces the evolution of EU law 
over time devotes only a chapter to freedom of movement of persons, in 
which, again, the focus is recent ECJ case law.56 Similarly, scholarship 
on CEE nationals’ mobility rights has tended to explain black letter law 
at the time of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements,57 and more recently, the 
effects of mobility on both sending and host States58 and on mobile CEE 
nationals themselves.59  
Critical scholars have critiqued post-accession transitional mobility 
limitations for undermining the concepts of equality and EU citizenship 
and for contradicting EU laws.60 They have not situated their critique, 
  
FOSTER ON EU LAW (6th ed. 2017); JOHN HANDOLL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE 
EU (1995); ERIKA SZYSZCZAK & ADAM CYGAN, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW (2nd ed. 
2008); LORNA WOODS ET AL., STEINER & WOODS EU LAW (13th ed. 2017). 
 53. See, e.g., Rebecca Zahn, ‘Common Sense’ or a Threat to EU Integration? The 
Court, Economically Inactive EU Citizens and Social Benefits, 44 INDUS. L. J. 573 
(2015). 
 54. See, e.g., ELISE MUIR, EU REGULATION OF ACCESS TO LABOUR MARKETS: A 
CASE STUDY OF EU CONSTRAINTS ON MEMBER STATE COMPETENCES Introduction (2012);  
CHRISTOFFER C. ERIKSEN, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION, WELFARE STATES AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE FOUR FREEDOMS VS NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 1.2 
(2012). 
 55. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, Introduction to EXCEPTIONS FROM EU FREE 
MOVEMENT LAW: DEROGATION, JUSTIFICATION AND PROPORTIONALITY at v, v-vii (Panos 
Koutrakos et al. eds., 2016). 
 56. Siofia O’Leary, Free Movement of Persons and Services, in THE EVOLUTION 
OF EU LAW 499–500 (Paul Craig & Gráinne De Búrca eds., 2nd ed. 2011). 
 57. See, e.g., Peter Van Elsuwege, The Treaty of Accession and Differentiation in 
the EU, 72 JURISPRUDENCIJA [JURIS.] 117-123 (2005) (Belg.). 
 58. See, e.g., Adrian Favell & Ettore Recchi, Pioneers of European Integration: 
an Introduction, in PIONEERS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CITIZENSHIP AND MOBILITY IN 
THE EU (Adrian Favell & Ettore Recchi eds., 2009). 
 59. Katherine Botterill, Mobility and Immobility in the European Union: 
Experiences of Young Polish People Living in the UK, 37 STUDIA MIGRACYJNE - 
PRZEGLĄD POLONIJNY [POLONIA AND MIGRATION STUD.] 47, 47–48, 54  (2011). 
 60. Sergio Carrera, What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in 
an Enlarged EU?, 11 EUROPEAN L. J. 699, 707–08 (2005); CURRIE, supra note 22, at 2; 
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however, in a broader analysis of the free movement right and its 
evolution. There is much space for a critical look at how CEE nationals 
have been situated in both the creation and application of the legal 
framework behind mobility, especially since they have been subjected to 
racialization, unlike western EU citizens. For example, EU institutions 
have portrayed them as fundamentally different than western Europeans: 
not part of European heritage and not entitled to the same treatment as 
those from western Member States.61 Moreover, the British media, 
politicians, and the public have attacked CEE movers,62 ultimately 
contributing to, at least in part, the outcome of the Brexit referendum.63  
Several tenets that both critical race theory (“CRT”) and critical 
whiteness studies (“CWS”) expound lay the groundwork for this article’s 
approach toward the intricate relationship between race, power, and law. 
Law, everyday discourse, economics, politics, and culture play a role in 
propagating white elites’ power and privilege by ignoring, naturalizing, 
sanctioning, and at times, inciting discrimination against other groups.64  
Those in positions of social power construct legal frameworks in ways 
that benefit them.65 To unpack law’s role, I have been re-examining 
historical and legal records to focus on the underlying assumptions and 
interests that they serve. The analysis in this Article relies on an 
empirical qualitative study based on systematic content analyses of 
relevant hard and soft laws, and legal discourse.66  
  
Dimitry Kochenov, The European Citizenship Concept and Enlargement of the Union, 3 
ROM. J. OF POL. SCI. 71, 73 (2003); DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE FREE MOVEMENT 
OF PEOPLE (Willem Maas ed., 2013). 
 61. See generally JÓZSEF BO ̈RO ̈CZ ET. AL., EMPIRE’S NEW CLOTHES: UNVEILING 
EU ENLARGEMENT (József Böröcz & Melinda Kovács eds., 2001). 
 62. Jon Fox et al., The Racialization of the New European Migration to the UK, 
46 SOC. 680, 686 (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., Lord Michael Ashcroft, How the United Kingdom voted on 
Thursday… and why, LORD ASHCROFT POLLS (June 24, 2016), 
http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/ (based on 
a survey of 12,369 voters). 
 64. See generally CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (discussing the evolution of Critical 
White Studies). 
 65. See generally id.  
 66. I also draw on historical, economic, political, and other background data to 
bolster my claims, and to place my findings in their local context. Content analysis allows 
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Despite relying on some tenets of CRT and CWS, I find both theories 
too essentialist at their core due to ignoring transnational and other non-
racial causes of inequalities,67 and due to focusing on homogeneous 
races: privileged whites, and underprivileged others. This Article will 
critique CRT and CWS analytical approaches for overlooking the 
significance of immigrant background and of white minority ethnicities 
in the conceptualization and experience of equality, racism, and 
privilege. It also considers how the formal legal framework (in its 
creation, interpretation, and specific policy contexts) approaches 
immigrants who do not easily fit the black-white paradigm. Taking into 
account contemporary transnational power dynamics, this Article aims to 
arrive at a more flexible and nuanced picture of micro-level racial and 
ethnic power relations.68 This Article not only poses new questions, but 
also relies on new data as I read the free movement framework critically 
from the point of view of contemporary CEE movers.  
Ironically, while today’s concepts of race and ethnicity have been 
largely the products of historical migrations, colonialism, and slavery, 
the continuing significance to that construction of contemporary 
movements of people has been overlooked by legal and race scholars, 
who tend to see their study groups through the black-white binary. Only 
by better understanding the ramifications of contemporary mobility on 
equality can we better respond to the cultural, economic, and political 
challenges posed by mobility and immigration in an increasingly 
globalizing world. More broadly, any inabilities of law to adequately 
respond to the experiences of immigrant groups might provide insights 
  
me to also consider texts’ latent characteristics, as well as any missing parts; and to make 
inferences from texts by relying on analytical constructs derived from my theoretical 
framework. As with all qualitative research, my purpose is not statistical generalization, 
but instead analytical generalization. That is, I seek to offer new insights based on 
theoretical and conceptual generalizations, and to help build better concepts and theories 
applicable to the world at large. 
 67. Although ClassCrits note the effects of lower socio-economic status on 
access to law and other power structures, and some critical scholars outside the United 
States have considered postcolonial effects on race construction, the role of globalization 
and contemporary immigrants in continuing to construct whiteness has been overlooked. 
LatCrit scholarship has opened up space for applying CRT to transnational power 
relations, but only between the global North and the global South. 
 68. I am also aware of intersectionality issues—especially gender, and class—
that affect the experience of equality by immigrants. 
396 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.3
   
into its inability to regulate other groups that do not neatly fit into 
privileged/disadvantaged binaries. This will hopefully lead to redefining 
concepts such as race, racism, discrimination, and equality so that they 
can better reflect multitudes of contemporary context-specific differences 
and power hierarchies. 
Below, this Article traces the free movement right from its initial 
conceptualization (in Part II.A.), through its temporary derogations in the 
aftermath of the Eastern Enlargement (in Part II. B.), to what it is today 
(in Part II.C.) to gain a better understanding of how EU institutions’ 
approaches might have evolved over time. Given that the right to 
mobility encompasses not only the rights to move and reside in other 
Member States, but also to access social benefits,69 this Article also 
traces the evolution of this provision for mobile EU citizens. It pays 
close attention to how CEE nationals have been affected by changes in 
the legal frameworks. Part III, summarizes the findings and reflects on 
their broader practical and theoretical implications.  
II.     FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT RIGHT: DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
MEASURES  
A.  Legal Framework Before the Eastern Enlargement  
1. Freedom of Movement Laws Before 2004  
The 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community prohibited discrimination in employment, remuneration, and 
working conditions of workers from the then-Member States.70 To 
facilitate creation of the common market, the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community called for the 
elimination of obstacles to the free movement of persons,71 and for 
abolition of nationality discrimination within the scope of application of 
  
 69. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2. 
 70. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 69(4), Apr. 
18, 1951, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF. 
 71. The Treaty of Rome, Belg.-Fr.-Ger.-It.-Lux.-Neth., art. 3(c), Mar. 25, 1957, 
https://ec.europa.eu/romania/sites/romania/files/tratatul_de_la_roma.pdf (along with 
freedoms of movement of goods, capital, and services). 
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the Treaty.72 Pursuant to Title III on the “Free Movement of Persons, 
Services and Capital” mobility pertained to workers only.73 Hence, 
nationality discrimination was forbidden in the context of “employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment”74 and could 
be limited only on grounds of public order, public safety, or public 
health.75 The ECJ defined nationality discrimination broadly to include 
direct, indirect,76 and covert measures.77 Criteria that applied regardless 
of nationality constituted indirect discrimination if there was a risk that 
they placed mobile workers at a particular disadvantage,78 such as high 
transfer fees for professional soccer players,79 residence conditions, or 
language requirements more easily satisfied by domestic workers.80 
Moreover, any limits imposed on mobility had to be proportionate to 
legitimate State goals.81  
Although originally limited to coal and steel workers, the right of free 
movement was gradually expanded through statutes and ECJ decisions to 
include all workers and some types of economically inactive persons. 
The 1993 Maastricht Treaty created the European Union and introduced 
the concept of a common EU citizenship.82 Hence, “[e]very citizen of the 
Union” (including both economically active and inactive persons) was to 
“have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
  
 72. Id. art. 7. 
 73. Id. title III ch. 1 art. 48–51. 
 74. Id. art. 48(2). Member States were permitted, however, to restrict access to 
public service posts to their own nationals. Id. art. 48(4).  
 75. Id. art. 48(3). 
 76. Case 15/69, Milchverwertung-Südmilch-AG v. Ugliola, 1969 E.C.R. 363, 
369.   
 77. Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Bundespost, 1974 E.C.R. 153, 164. 
 78. See Case C-237/94, O’Flynn v. Adjudication Officer, 1996 E.C.R. I-2631, I-
2638. 
 79. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association 
v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5043, I-5064. 
 80. See Case C-379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ., 1989 E.C.R. 3987, 3991; 
Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 2000 E.C.R. I-
5148, I-5167. 
 81. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
2002 E.C.R. I-7136, I-7169. 
 82. Treaty on European Union art. 8, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 202) 15 [hereinafter 
Maastricht Treaty]. 
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Member States.”83 Although its scope had to be determined by reference 
to secondary legislation, the recognition of the free movement right at the 
Treaty level indicated that no arbitrary or disproportionate intrusions 
would be permitted.
 84 
a. Workers  
Worker status has been a precursor of not only mobility protections, 
but also residence rights, and access to social benefits and tax 
advantages. Noting that the concept must not be interpreted narrowly,85 
the ECJ has gradually expanded this status, to include all who “for a 
certain period of time . . . perfor[m] services for and under the direction 
of another person in return for . . . remuneration.”86 The amount of 
remuneration is irrelevant, and the worker may draw upon public 
assistance,87 as long as the services performed are of commercial value to 
the recipient.88 Specific motives for undertaking work are irrelevant, so 
securing work with the main aim of obtaining access to public assistance 
would not disqualify one from worker status.89  Although the economic 
activity undertaken must be “genuine” and “effective,” rather than 
“purely marginal and ancillary,”90 no specific working hours are 
required.91 Thus, those employed short-term, seasonally, or part-time, 
and even apprentices and trainees may qualify as workers. Working 
  
 83. Id. art. 8(a). 
 84. Id. art. 8. The right was subject to “limitations and conditions laid down in 
this Treaty, and by measures adopted to give it effect.” Id. art. 8(a). 
 85. See Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer 
Groep, 1999 E.C.R. I-3289, I-3310. 
 86. Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1986 E.C.R. 2121, 
2144. 
 87. See Case 139/85, Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1986 E.C.R. 1741, 
1750-51. 
 88. See Case 196/87, Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1988 E.C.R. 6159, 
6173. 
 89. See Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, 
Verkehr und Kunst, 2003 E.C.R. I-13187, I-13230. 
 90. Id. at I-13227, 13230; Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 
E.C.R. 1035, 1050. 
 91. See C-14/09, Hava Genc v. Land Berlin, 2010 E.C.R. I-931, I-944. Even 
fewer than 5 ½ hours per week have been found to be sufficient. Id. at I-939. 
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“only a very limited number of hours,” however, may not be sufficient.92 
Self-employed persons have been considered “workers.”93 The Advocate 
General has defined that status broadly as working for oneself, being 
solely responsible for one’s own business,94 and abiding by applicable 
national regulations (such as any registrations, record keeping, and 
income tax payments).95 The burden is on the host State to demonstrate 
sham self-employment.96 
Noting that “obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated,” 
Regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of movement of workers called for 
equality of treatment between domestic and Community workers “in fact 
and in law in respect of all matters relating to the actual pursuit of 
activities as employed persons and to eligibility for housing.”97 More 
specifically, it prohibited any discriminatory legal or administrative 
measures that could hinder or restrict those persons from other Member 
States from undertaking employment.98 Employment offices were to 
provide equal assistance to jobseekers from other Member States.99 
Although Member States could request temporary suspension of 
workers’ free movement if undergoing or foreseeing disturbances in the 
labor market “which could seriously threaten the standard of living or 
level of employment in a given region or occupation,” it was up to the 
Commission to authorize such suspension.100 No such request had ever 
been made under the Regulation.  
Directive 68/360 sought to further abolish restrictions on movement 
and residence rights of mobile workers by simplifying procedures for 
  
 92. Case 357/89, Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 1992 
E.C.R. I-1027, I-1060. 
 93. See, e.g., Case C‑214/16, King v. Sash Window Workshop Ltd., 2017 E.C.R. 
439, ¶ 15, 17. 
 94. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 
E.C.R. I-1459, I-1491. 
 95. Id. at I-1465. 
 96. Id. at I-1492. 
 97. Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on 
Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Community, Preamble, 1968 O.J. 475, 
475. 
 98. Id. art. 3–4. 
 99. Id. art. 5. 
 100. Id. art. 20. 
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entering and obtaining residence cards in other Member States.101 For 
example, host States were not permitted to charge higher fees for 
residence permits than dues charged for issuance of their citizens’ 
identity cards.102  
EU-15 workers’ statutory residence rights were further strengthened 
by the ECJ. For example, the Court ruled that national residence 
formalities, such as requiring mandatory residence permits, which went 
beyond Directive 68/360’s duty to report one’s presence in the host 
State103 were an impermissible obstacle to free movement.104 Failing to 
comply with all the formalities of the Directive did not justify workers’ 
expulsion.105 Moreover, in Martinez Sala, the Court ruled that a host 
State was precluded from requiring nationals of other Member States 
authorized to reside there to produce formal residence permits to receive 
social advantages if the same were not required of its own nationals.106 
To reach this decision, the Court relied on the Maastricht Treaty’s 
prohibition of nationality discrimination of EU citizens.107 More 
generally, any national conditions on residency provisions under the 
Directive were required to satisfy the proportionality test.108  
Before the Eastern Enlargement, mobility restrictions on workers had 
been imposed only once, during the Southern Enlargement of Greece in 
1981 (for six years) and of Spain and Portugal in 1986 (for six years, 
shortened to five years after Council review).109 Like the transitional 
  
 101. See Council Directive 68/360, of 15 October 1968 on the Abolition of 
Restrictions on Movement and Residence Within the Community for Workers of 
Member States and Their Families, art. 9(3), 1968 O.J. (L 257) 13. 
 102. Id. art. 9. 
 103. Id. art. 8(2). 
 104. See Case C-344/95, Commission v. Belgium, 1997 E.C.R. I-1035, I-1056. 
 105. See Case 48/75, Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497, 504. 
 106. See Case C-86/96 Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691, I-
2724. 
 107. Id. at ¶ 55 (citing Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, at art. 6). 
 108. See Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
2002 E.C.R. I-7136, I-7171. 
 109. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2194/91 of 25 June 1991 on the 
Transitional Period for Freedom of Movement of Workers Between Spain and Portugal, 
on the One Hand, and the other Member States, on the Other Hand, 1991 O.J. (L 206) 1; 
see U.K. HOME OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON MIGRATION FLOWS, 2003, 
25/03, at 12, http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/14332/1/14332.pdf. 
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measures during the Eastern Enlargement, they relied on explicit 
derogations of Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation 1612/68 (pertaining to 
workers’ right to take up employment in other Member States).110 These 
earlier restrictions, however, were implemented before Maastricht 
Treaty’s creation of EU citizenship111 and before the borderless Schengen 
Area was established through the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty.112 
b. Economically Inactive Movers (Including Jobseekers) 
Secondary laws slowly expanded former workers’ access to the 
freedom of movement right. According to Directive 68/360, those 
temporarily incapable of work due to medical issues or accidents, or 
those involuntarily unemployed were not automatically deprived of 
residence rights.113 Once a worker had been involuntarily unemployed for 
more than a year, Member States could restrict such former worker’s 
residence permit renewal period, but to no less than twelve months.114 
Moreover, pursuant to Regulation 1251/70, workers who had reached 
retirement age or had become permanently incapacitated while working 
in a host State had the right to remain there.115  
In the 1990s, freedom of movement also became guaranteed through 
secondary laws for students, pensioners, and the unemployed, as well as 
for their families. This was further reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty’s 
creation of EU citizenship and extension of the right of mobility to all 
  
 110. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Portuguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties ,1985 O.J. (L 302) 23, art. 
56, 216.  
 111. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, at art. 8. The only previous 
enlargement that took place after Maastricht did not include any impediments on mobility 
(involving Finland, Sweden, and Austria in 1995). Matthew J. Gabel, European Union, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 112. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 
O.J. (C 340) 1, 93. 
 113. Council Directive 68/360, supra note 102, at art. 7(1). 
 114. Id. art. 7(2). 
 115. Commission Regulation 1251/70, art. 8(2), 1970 O.J. (L 142). 
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EU citizens.116 However, pursuant to Directives 90/364, 93/96, and 
90/365, economically inactive movers were required to have 
comprehensive sickness insurance (whether public or private) in the host 
State and “sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social 
[security] system of the host Member State during their period of 
residence.”117 For students, a mere declaration regarding resources 
sufficed.118 “Sufficient resources” amounted to at least the level at which 
host State nationals became eligible for social assistance.119 In making 
this determination, Member States were expected to consider each 
applicant’s personal circumstances, and all resources which were easily 
accessible to the applicant.120   
The ECJ has been supportive of non-economically active EU citizens’ 
right to reside in other Member States. For example, the Court found that 
jobseekers had a Treaty right to move and reside in other States “for the 
purposes of seeking employment.”121 Although host States did have a 
right to expel them if they did not have a “genuine chance[]” of finding 
employment, jobseekers were afforded a “reasonable time” to conduct 
their search122—more than three months,123 and possibly more than six 
months.124 Moreover, EU nationals who became unemployed after 
having worked in a host country were entitled to the right “to look for or 
pursue an occupation.”125 
  
 116. Ottavio Marzocchi, Free movement of persons, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 
2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/147/free-movement-of-persons. 
 117. Council Directive 90/364, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (EC); Council 
Directive 93/96, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 317) 59 (EC); Council Directive 90/365, art. 1, 1990 
O.J.  (L 180) 28 (EC). 
 118. Council Directive 93/96, supra note 117, at art. 1. 
 119. Council Directive 90/364, supra note 117, at art. 1. 
 120. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the Implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96, at 10, COM (1999) 127 final 
(Mar. 17, 1999). 
 121. Case C-292/89, The Queen v. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte 
Gustaff Desiderius Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. I-745, ¶ 13. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Case C-344/95, Comm’n v. Belgium, 1997 E.C.R. I- 1035, at I-1058–59. 
 124. Case C-292/89, The Queen v. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte 
Gustaff Desiderius Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. I-745, at I-780. 
 125. Case 48/75, Jean Noël Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497, at ¶ 31.  
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Before 2004, the ECJ often drew on Treaty provisions regarding non-
discrimination and EU citizenship to sidestep some of the limitations on 
mobility imposed by secondary legislation. For example, in Grzelczyk,
 
the ECJ proclaimed that EU citizenship, as a “fundamental status,” called 
for financial solidarity among all EU citizens.
 126 Thus, as long as mobile 
EU nationals were lawfully resident in another State, they could rely on 
the Treaty’s prohibition of nationality discrimination in the context of 
free movement and residence rights.127 In Baumbast, the Court held that 
refusing a former worker residence because his sickness insurance did 
not cover emergency treatment in the host State constituted 
disproportionate interference with the exercise of Treaty rights.128 
Finally, in D’Hoop, the Court concluded that any penalties on a mobile 
national’s return to their home country (such as refusing to grant tide-
over allowance due to having completed secondary education in another 
Member State) constituted impermissible obstacles to free movement.
 129  
c. CEE Nationals 
Before the Eastern Enlargement, none of the above rights applied to 
third-country nationals (“TCNs”), such as those from CEE countries. The 
Agreements on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation 
entered into by the European Economic Community,130 existing Member 
States, and individual CEE states in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
focused on just that—trade, commercial, and economic cooperation—
with no mention of mobility.131 This was followed by individual Europe 
Agreements in the 1990s, which approached CEE workers like TCNs 
  
 126. See, e.g., Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale 
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 31. 
 127. Id. (as applied to students). 
 128. Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2001 
E.C.R. I-7091, ¶ 93. 
 129. Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office nat’l d’emploi, E.C.R. I-6191, ¶¶ 30–31.  
 130. The EU’s predecessor. 
 131. See generally Matthew J. Gabel, European Community, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-
economic-association (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
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and did not provide them with any degree of mobility.132 Despite the 
Agreements’ liberalization of the movement of capital, goods, and 
services, sections on the “Movement of Workers, Establishment, Supply 
of Services” did not even mention the right to free movement of 
persons.133 Instead, existing Member States were permitted to continue 
applying their immigration rules to CEE nationals, although they were 
not permitted to make them more demanding than they had been at the 
time of signing of the Europe Agreements.134 Since the Agreements did 
nothing to positively facilitate mobility, CEE nationals lawfully resident 
in EU-15 States were there pursuant to a few national regimes and ad hoc 
bilateral agreements that permitted temporary-worker schemes (and 
responded to specific employer needs),135 as refugees, or as family 
members of EU nationals.  
Under Europe Agreements, those lawfully employed in the Member 
States in accordance with their immigration laws136 were entitled to 
protection from nationality-based discrimination (in terms of working 
conditions, remuneration, and dismissal) and could be joined by their 
families.137 According to the ECJ, these non-discrimination provisions 
had a direct effect, so they could be relied on by CEE workers before 
  
 132. See, e.g., Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of 
Poland, of the other part, Art. 37, Dec. 16, 1991, https://www.fdfa.be/en/europe-
agreement-establishing-an-association-between-the-european-communities-and-their-
member-3 [hereinafter Europe Agreement with Poland].The only limited exception was 
pursuant to the right of free establishment for highly-skilled “key personnel” employed 
by CEE companies operating in EU-15 States. Id. art. 52. 
 133. Id. title IV.  
 134. See, e.g., Id. art. 41. 
 135. See Communication from the Commission on the Impact of Enlargement on 
Regions Bordering Candidate Countries: Community Action for Bordering Regions, at 11 
n.6, COM (2001) 437 final (July 25, 2001).For example, since the early 1990s, Poland, 
Romania, and Bulgaria had bilateral agreements with Germany, all tied to specific 
German labor market needs and permitting small quotas of temporary workers. See, e.g., 
Guest Worker Programs: Germany, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/guestworker/germany.php (last updated: July 31, 2015). 
 136. See generally Case C-162/00, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Pokrzeptowicz-
Meyer, 2002 E.C.R. I-1049. 
 137. See, e.g., Europe Agreement with Poland, supra note 132, at art. 37(1). 
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national courts.138 Moreover, their scope was deemed identical to 
equality rights conferred on EU-15 nationals under Treaty provisions.139 
Thus, in Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, the ECJ struck down a national provision 
according to which positions for foreign-language assistants could be 
filled through fixed-term contracts, whereas for other teaching staff, 
recourse to such contracts had to be individually justified.140 In Kolpak, 
the Court concluded that a sports federation rule authorizing clubs to 
field only a limited number of players from among TCNs could not be 
applied to lawfully employed CEE athletes.
 141  
Despite the ECJ’s broad application of the Europe Agreements’ non-
discrimination clauses, they were of little practical impact because the 
Agreements applied to so few categories of CEE nationals. They did not 
apply to economically inactive persons, jobseekers, or posted workers.142 
They also did not apply to those engaged in informal work arrangements, 
which have been popular among CEE nationals.143 Self-employed CEE 
nationals relied on non-discrimination provisions under the Agreements’ 
establishment clauses,144 and only if they could demonstrate sufficient 
financial resources.145 Given income discrepancies between EU and CEE 
states, possessing sufficient resources would have been difficult to prove 
for CEE nationals.146 In addition, impediments on CEE nationals’ travel 
  
 138. Id.; Case C-162/00, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, 
2002 E.C.R. I-1049, ¶ 1. 
 139. See, e.g., Europe Agreement with Poland, supra note 132, at art. 37(1). 
 140. See generally Case C-162/00, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Pokrzeptowicz-
Meyer, 2002 E.C.R. I-1049, ¶ 1. 
 141. Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Kolpak, 2003 E.C.R. I-4135, 
I-4173. 
 142. See generally Council Directive 96/71, Concerning the Posting of Workers in 
the Framework of the Provision of Services, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 18) 1, 3 (EC) (laying out 
the separate legal regime that governs posted workers). 
 143. Daniela Andrén & Monica Roman, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Romanian 
Migrants during Transition and Enlargements 9-10 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, 
Discussion Paper No. 8690, 2014); KUBAL, supra note 24, at 22; Romania, FOCUS 
MIGRATION, http://focusmigration.hwwi.de/Romania.2515.0.html?&L=1 (last visited, 
Oct. 03, 2018). 
 144. See, e.g., Europe Agreement with Poland, supra note 132, at art. 44–54. 
 145. Case C-37/98, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-2927, I-2964–66. 
 146. See, e.g., Eurostat News Release STAT/04/73, GDP per capita nowcast for 
2003: GDP per capita in new Member States ranges from 42% of EU25 average in Latvia 
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to EU-15 States (close to a ban until 1989 under Communism, and visa 
requirements to enter the EU until 2001)147 would have inhibited their 
chances of establishing networks and possessing local know-how 
necessary to undertake self-employment.  
2. Access to Social Benefits by Mobile Individuals Before 
2004  
The freedom of movement right is also inherently linked to equality in 
the receipt of social benefits and tax advantages.148 Thus, since the 1960s, 
secondary laws and ECJ decisions have provided access to social 
benefits to at least some groups of mobile Member State nationals.  
a. Workers  
Pursuant to Regulation 1612/68, Member States were mandated to 
treat workers from other Member States (from the first day of their 
employment) equally with domestic workers in the provision of social 
and tax advantages,149 and in “matters of housing.”150 Furthermore, 
workers had the right to be joined by their families,151 who were to be 
integrated into host State societies.152 The Commission advocated this 
Regulation’s broad interpretation.153 Moreover, Regulation 1408/71, 
  
to 83% in Cyprus (June 03, 2004), www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-04-
73_en.pdf. 
 147. Franck Düvell, Polish Undocumented Immigrants, Regular High-Skilled 
Workers and Entrepreneurs in the UK (Warsaw Univ. Inst. for Soc. Studies, Migration 
Paper No. 54, 2004). 
 148. Free Movement – EU Nationals, EUR. COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=457& (last visited Apr. 06, 2019). 
 149. Council Regulation 1612/68, supra note 97, at art. 7(2). 
 150. Id. art. 9(1). 
 151. Id. art. 10. 
 152. Id. art. 11–12. 
 153. Jaime L. Fuster, Council Regulation 1612/68: A Significant Step in 
Promoting the Right of Freedom of Movement within the EEC, 11 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 127, 134 (1988). 
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implemented through Regulation 574/72, governed coordination in the 
provision of social security benefits to mobile workers.154  
Although Regulation 1612/68 applied to workers only (including 
permanent, seasonal and frontier workers, and those providing services), 
the ECJ had interpreted the concept of “worker” broadly, as discussed 
earlier.155 “[S]ocial advantages,” not defined in the Regulation, were also 
interpreted broadly156 by the ECJ to cover all the advantages national 
workers enjoy primarily due to their status as workers or as residents in 
their home States, the extension of which seems likely to facilitate 
mobility157 regardless of whether the specific advantages are linked to 
employment contracts.158 For example, they include discretionary 
benefits,159 welfare benefits,160 benefits granted after employment is 
terminated,161 and at least some benefits not directly linked to 
employment, such as the right to be accompanied in the host State by a 
partner,162 the grant of funeral expenses fund,163 and children’s access to 
student grants.164 They also encompass rights that represent “an 
  
 154. See generally Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 
on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and Their Families 
Moving within the Community, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2; Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of the 
Council of 21 March 1972 Fixing the Procedure for Implementing Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and Their 
Families Moving within the Community, 1972 O.J. (L 74) 1. 
 155. See supra Part II Section A.1.a. 
 156. Case 207/78, Ministère Public v. Even and Office National des Pensions pour 
Travailleurs Salaries, 1979 E.C.R. 2019, 2026. 
 157. See Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691, I-
2717. 
 158. Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, 
1985 E.C.R. 973, 985. 
 159. Case 65/81, Reina & Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg, 1982 
E.C.R. 33, 45. 
 160. See Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk 
Welzijn, 1985 E.C.R. 973, ¶ 22. 
 161. Case C-57/96, Meints v. Minister van Landbouw, 1997 E.C.R. I-6689, I-
6719. 
 162. Case 59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. 1283, ¶ 3. 
 163. See Case C-237/94, O’Flynn v. Adjudication Officer, 1996 E.C.R. I-2617, ¶ 
14. 
 164. See Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofdirectie van de Informatie Beheer 
Groep, 1999 E.C.R. I-3289, ¶ 19. 
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important role in the integration of a migrant worker and his family into 
the host country, and thus in achieving the objective of free movement 
for workers,” such as the right to have criminal court proceedings in the 
worker’s native language.165 Advantages available to workers’ 
dependents are also included.166 National tax rules that deter EU citizens 
from exercising the free movement right - for example, denying a refund 
of excess income tax when changing residence to another Member 
State167 - may constitute an impermissible obstacle to mobility.168  
b. Economically-Inactive Movers (Including Jobseekers)  
Even after the extension of EU citizenship to economically inactive 
EU nationals,169 they were not statutorily provided with access to social 
benefits. However, by the late 1990s, the ECJ became instrumental in 
extending access to social benefits to include such movers by relying on 
Treaty non-discrimination provisions to overstep limitations imposed by 
secondary EU legislation. For example, according to Martinez Sala 
(1998), all EU citizens lawfully resident in another Member State fell 
under Treaty protections and hence were entitled to social benefits, 
including benefits under Regulations 1408/71 (social security benefits) 
and 1612/68 (social and tax advantages).170 In Grzelczyk, the ECJ derived 
a principle of financial solidarity between all EU citizens based on the 
Treaty, to preclude a national measure which made mobile students’ 
entitlement to a non-contributory social benefit (such as a minimum 
subsistence allowance) conditional on demonstrating “sufficient 
resources” when no such condition applied to domestic students.171 The 
Court also noted that recourse to social assistance could not 
  
 165. Case 137/84, Ministère Public v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, 2696. 
 166. See Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofdirectie van de Informatie Beheer 
Groep, 1999 E.C.R. I-3289, ¶ 25. 
 167. E.g., Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des contributions du grand-
duché de Luxembourg, 1990 E.C.R. I-1779, I-1791. 
 168. Id. at I-1792. 
 169. See supra note 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 170. Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691, I-2727. 
 171. See Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193, I-6234, I-6249. 
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automatically lead to a denial of residence permit.172 Drawing on its 
ruling in Grzelczyk, the ECJ held in Bidar that a student’s right to reside 
in the host Member State was primarily regulated by Treaty provisions 
and thus included the right to equal treatment in obtaining social 
assistance benefits (including maintenance grants or loans).173  
c. CEE Nationals  
The only TCNs to whom Regulations 1408/71 and 1612/68 applied 
were family members of EU citizens.174 During the 1990s, the 
Commission had made several proposals to extend social security 
protections afforded to mobile EU nationals to TCNs lawfully employed 
in the EU, but none came to fruition.175 None of the Europe Agreements 
with CEE states addressed social benefits, other than coordinating social 
security systems for workers.176 
B.  Legal Regime after 2004, Including in the Aftermath of the 
Eastern Enlargement  
1. Freedom of Movement Laws After 2004  
Existing regulations and case law pertaining to mobility and residence 
rights were consolidated and replaced by Directive 2004/38 (the “Free 
  
 172. Id. at ¶ 42–43. 
 173. Case C-209/03, The Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, 2005 E.C.R. I-
2119, I-2164, I-2174. 
 174. Council Regulation 1408/71, art. 2(1), 1971 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 149) 416, 420 
(EEC); Council Regulation 1612/68, art. 7(2), 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. 475, 477 (EEC). 
In addition to that, refugees were also covered under Regulation 1408/71. Council 
Regulation 1408/71, supra, at 420. 
 175. See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 or the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to 
self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community 
and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, at 2, COM (1991) 528 final (Dec. 13, 1991);  Commission 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 as 
regards its extension to nationals of third countries, COM (1997) 561 final (Dec. 10, 
1997). 
 176. See, e.g., Europe Agreement with Poland, supra note 132, art. 38. 
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Movement Directive”), which was adopted two days before the 2004 
enlargement and is still in effect.177 The Directive provided all EU 
citizens with the right to reside in other Member States for up to three 
months without any formalities or conditions.178 Moreover, the Directive 
extended the right to be joined by family members to all mobile EU 
citizens,179 and granted a new right of permanent residence after five 
years of lawful residence.180 Member States were forbidden from 
requiring movers to hold residence permits,181 although they were 
permitted to compel them to register their presence within a reasonable 
and non-discriminatory time frame after more than three months.182  
The Directive strengthened substantive and procedural safeguards 
available to mobile individuals whose rights of free movement or 
residence had been restricted.183 Host States’ ability to deny or terminate 
rights of residence were limited to “grounds of public policy, public 
security, [and] public health,” which could “not be invoked to serve 
economic ends,”184 and fraud or abuse of rights.185 Workers, self-
employed persons, and jobseekers could only be expelled on grounds of 
public policy or public security.186 Host States could impose re-entry 
bans against those who had been expelled only on grounds of public 
policy, public security, or public health.187 An expulsion measure could 
  
 177. Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004, on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77. 
 178. Id. art. 6. 
 179. Id. art. 3. 
 180. Id. art.16–17. 
 181. Id. art. 25. 
 182. Id. art. 8. 
 183. Id. art. 15. 
 184. Id. art. 27. “Measures taken on [grounds of] public policy or public security” 
must be proportionate and based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual 
(which presents “a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat” to a fundamental 
interest of the host society). Id. Those taken due to public health must be based on only 
the most serious infectious diseases occurring within three months of arrival. Id. art. 29. 
 185. Id. art. 35. Fraud or abuse of rights must be directly related to obtaining the 
rights of free movement or residence. See European Commission, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 186. Directive 2004/38, supra note 177, at Recital 16. 
 187. Id. art. 15(3). 
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not be an automatic consequence of recourse to social assistance.188 
According to the ECJ, expulsion of an EU citizen was an exceptional 
measure, requiring individual examination of each specific case.189 The 
proportionality principle applied to any such restrictions on mobility, and 
the burden of proof was on the host State.190 
a. Workers  
Pursuant to the Free Movement Directive, workers (including self-
employed individuals) had an automatic right to reside in other Member 
States for longer than three months without any formalities to satisfy.191 
“Worker” status included former workers temporarily unable to work 
due to illnesses or accidents.192 Those who became involuntarily 
unemployed after at least a year of employment in a host State retained 
their “worker” status indefinitely as long as they were registered as 
jobseekers with an employment office.193 If they had worked for less than 
a year, however, they retained “worker” status for at least six months.194  
The ECJ continued to define “worker” status broadly. For example, 
the Court ruled in Trojani that performing various jobs for Salvation 
Army, which totaled “[thirty] hours a week, as part of a personal 
reintegration programme, in return for . . . benefits in kind and some 
pocket money” constituted employment.195  Even working fewer than 
five-and-a-half hours per week has been found sufficient.196 Similarly, 
the ECJ has continued to define “self-employment” broadly, as working 
for oneself and being solely responsible for one’s own business.197  
  
 188. Id. art. 14(3). 
 189. Case C-348/09, P.I. v. Oberbürgermeisterin de Stadt Remscheid, 2012 E.C.R. 
1. 
 190. Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 177, at art. 27–28. 
 191. Id. art. 7. 
 192. Id. art. 7(3)(a). 
 193. Id. art. 7(3)(b). 
 194. Id. art. 7(3)(c). 
 195. Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles, 2004 
E.C.R. I-7573, ¶¶ 20, 29. 
 196. Case C-14/09, Genc v. Land Berlin, 2010 E.C.R. I-931, I-940–42. 
 197. See generally EurWORK, Self-employed person, EUROFOUND (Feb. 22, 
2019), https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-
dictionary/self-employed-person. 
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b. Economically Inactive Movers  
Pursuant to Directive 2004/38, economically inactive movers’ right to 
reside for more than three months is conditioned on having 
comprehensive health insurance and “sufficient resources” so as “not to 
become a burden on the social” welfare system of the receiving State.198 
Member States are prohibited from setting a fixed amount “below which 
the right of residence can be automatically refused.”199 Instead, 
determining “sufficient resources” should be a fact-intensive process 
based on “the personal situation of the person concerned”,200 including 
resources from third persons, and both periodic and accumulated 
capital.201 Member States are encouraged to carry out a proportionality 
test202 in making this determination.203 The threshold may “not be higher 
than the [level] below which nationals of the host Member State become 
eligible for social assistance, or . . . than the minimum social security 
pension paid by the host Member State.”204 What constitutes “sufficient 
resources” should be interpreted in the light of the Directive’s objective, 
that is, facilitating mobility.205 Only the actual receipt of social assistance 
benefits may be considered relevant in determining an “unreasonable 
burden,” after considering the duration of such benefits receipt, their 
amount, and each recipient’s personal situation.206 Although Member 
States may expel economically inactive movers (unless they are 
permanent residents) if they become an “unreasonable burden”, such 
expulsions may not be an automatic consequence of relying on social 
assistance.207  
  
 198. Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 177, at art.  7(1)(b). 
 199. Id. art. 8(4); See European Commission, supra note 5. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See European Commission, supra note 5, at 8. 
 202. Id. Adequacy of insurance must also be determined in accordance with 
proportionality principle. Id. at 9. 
 203. Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 177, at Recital 16, 23. 
 204. Id. art. 8(4). 
 205. Id.; id. at Recital 1–3, 16. 
 206. Id. at Recital 16, art. 8(4). 
 207. Id. art. 14(3). 
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c. First-Time Jobseekers  
Among all the economically inactive categories, residence rights of 
those who enter another Member State to seek employment are the most 
complicated. Although jobseekers must demonstrate self-sufficiency and 
having health insurance (like all economically non-active groups), 
Article 14(4)(b) prohibits their expulsion as long as they have a “genuine 
chance” of finding employment—that is, as long as they continue to 
demonstrate some prospects of finding employment, even after searching 
for more than six months.208 Because jobseekers can only be expelled on 
grounds of public policy or public security, in practice, first-time 
jobseekers can reside without having to prove self-sufficiency.209  
d. CEE Nationals  
Although EU citizenship has always been differentiated by statutory 
and case law, workers have always been privileged over those who are 
economically inactive. The Eastern Enlargement temporarily reversed 
that hierarchy in the context of CEE nationals. Although empirical 
studies at the time of the Enlargement predicted that EU-15 States would 
benefit economically from CEE workers’ mobility and that CEE movers 
would not rely heavily on host States’ welfare systems,210 both 2004 and 
2007 Accession Treaties expressly blocked application of Treaty Article 
39(2), which abolished discrimination of mobile workers in the context 
of employment.
 211  Member States could derogate for up to seven years 
  
 208. Case C-292/89, The Queen v. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte 
Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. I-745, ¶ 22. 
 209. Case C-138/02, Collins v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, 2004 E.C.R. 
I-2703; Case C-258/04, Office national de l’emploi v. Ioannidis, 2005 E.C.R. I-8275. 
 210. See generally Tito Boeri & Herbert Brücker, Why Are Europeans so Tough 
on Migrants?, 20 ECON. POL’Y 629, 629–703 (2005); European Commission, 
Employment in Europe 2008 Report, at 132–37 (October 2008), 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=681&langId=en; Resolution on the 
Transitional Arrangements Restricting the Free Movement of Workers on EU Labour 
Markets (2006/2036 (INI)), EUR. PARL. DOC. O.J. C 293 E (Dec. 2, 2006); Elena Jileva, 
Visa and Free Movement of Labour: The Uneven Imposition of the EU Acquis on the 
Accession States, 28 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 683, 690–97 (2002). 
 211. See, e.g., Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of 
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from Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation 1612/68 (pertaining to mobility 
of economically active persons), and from provisions of Directive 68/360 
(pertaining to mobile workers’ residence rights).212 Transitional 
restrictions also limited access of workers’ families to EU-15 labor 
markets.213 Accession Treaties were silent about residence and 
citizenship rights214 and did not offer any justification for these 
derogations.  
EU-15 States were provided wide discretion in restricting CEE 
workers’ mobility during the entire seven-year transitional periods. For 
the first two years after accession, EU-15 States could continue to apply 
their pre-accession national measures or bilateral agreements215 as long 
as employers gave priority to all EU workers (including CEE workers) 
over TCNs.216 Before the end of the initial two-year phase, the Council 
was to “review the functioning” of transitional arrangements, but this 
“review” had no binding effect.217 In practice, Member States could 
decide unilaterally to continue imposing their national measures during 
the second (three-year) phase after simply notifying the 
  
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the 
Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on 
which the European Union is founded, Annex XII, ¶ 2(1) 2003 O.J. (L 236) 33 
[hereinafter Poland Accession]; Act concerning the conditions of accession of the 
Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded, Annex VI, 2005 O.J. (157) 278 [hereinafter Bulgaria 
Accession]. 
 212. See, e.g., Poland Accession, supra note 211, at Annex XII ¶ 2(2). 
 213. Bulgaria Accession, supra note 211, at Annex VI ¶ 8. This treatment was less 
favorable than the family reunification rights conferred on TCNs pursuant to Directive 
2003/86, and less favorable than the rights conferred by the Europe Agreements. Council 
Directive 2003/86, art. 2–3, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12; see, e.g., Europe Agreement with 
Poland, supra note 132, at art. 38. This approach was also likely in conflict with ECJ case 
law stemming from the transitional measures imposed during Greece’s accession in 1981. 
See Case C-77/82, Peskeloglou v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1983 E.C.R. 1085, 1093–95. 
 214. Moreover, there was not much discussion of these concepts in their 
legislative histories. 
 215. See, e.g., Poland Accession, supra note 211, at Annex XII. As long as they 
were not more restrictive than those in force on the day of signing the Accession Treay. 
Id. at Annex XII ¶ (2)14. 
 216. See, e.g., Id. at Annex XII ¶ 2. 
 217. Monika Byrska, The Unfinished Enlargement: Report on Free Movement of 
People in EU-25, at 10, EUR. CITIZEN ACTION SERV. (May 2004), http://edz.bib.uni-
mannheim.de/daten/edz-k/gde/04/498.pdf. 
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Commission.218Thereafter, States that had been applying restrictive 
measures had the discretion to continue applying them for two additional 
years “in case of serious disturbances” of their labor markets or merely in 
response to “a threat thereof,” after notifying the Commission.219 No 
prior authorization by any EU body was required, and neither the 
Commission’s role nor the concept of “serious disturbances” was ever 
clarified.220 Most Member States relied on transitional measures, during 
both parts of the Eastern Enlargement.221 
In addition, any Member State that had not initially applied 
transitional restrictions could request at any point before the end of the 
seven-year periods that the Commission authorize mobility derogations if 
it experienced or merely could “foresee disturbances on its labour market 
which could seriously threaten the standard of living or the level of 
  
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 11. 
 220. Adelina Adinolfi, Free Movement and Access to Work of Citizens of the New 
Member States: The Transitional Measures, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 469, 493 (2005). 
 221. After the 2004 enlargement, during the first phase (2004-06), all EU-15 
States other than Ireland, the UK, and Sweden imposed direct mobility restrictions 
(Ireland and the UK also imposed limitations on access to social benefits); during 2006-
09, additional nine Member States opened their labor markets; Austria and Germany 
were the only two states to have continued direct restrictions after 2009. Commission 
Report on Transitional Arrangements Regarding Free Movement of Workers, 
MEMO/08/718 (Nov. 18, 2008); Frequently asked questions: The end of transitional 
arrangements for the free movement of workers on 30 April 2011, MEMO/11/259 (Apr. 
28, 2011). After the 2007 enlargement, during the first phase (2007-09), Hungary, and all 
EU-15 states except Finland and Sweden imposed restrictions. Communication From the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions: The Impact of Free Movement of 
Workers in the Context of EU Enlargement 
Report on the First Phase (1 January 2007 – 31 December 2008) of the Transitional 
Arrangements Set Out in the 2005 Accession Treaty and as Requested According to the 
Transitional Arrangement Set Out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, at 5, COM (2008) 765 
final (Nov. 18, 2008). UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg maintained restrictions until the end of 2013. Agnieszka Fihel et al., 
Free movement of workers and transitional arrangements: lessons from the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements, at 16, (2015), 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14000&langId=en. Moreover, after 
invoking safeguard clause, Spain imposed restrictions between 2011 and 2013. 
Commission Authorises Spain to Extend Existing Temporary Restrictions on Romanian 
Workers Press Release (Dec. 21, 2012). 
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employment in a given region or occupation” to be in place until the 
situation was restored to “normal.”222 Again, none of the key terms were 
defined. Moreover, in “urgent and exceptional” cases, Member States 
could unilaterally suspend application of the free movement acquis at 
any point before the end of the seven-year periods.223 In the end, none of 
these provisions were applied in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement. 
However, Spain obtained the Commission’s authorization to suspend 
free movement of workers from Romania between August 2011 and 
December 2013, after having opened up its labor market in 2009.224 
Although to obtain such authorization, a Member State was required to 
support its “convincing” arguments with specific data rather than merely 
citing unemployment rates,225 Spain was given permission based on 
unemployment rates alone (of both its own nationals and Romanian 
nationals in Spain).226  
Transitional mobility restrictions are not challengeable under EU law. 
Article 18 of the Treaty allows for limitations of the free movement 
right.227 Moreover, the ECJ did not have jurisdiction to challenge their 
legality because they were an integral part of the Accession Treaties, and 
hence, primary law.228 Of course, since provisions limiting the freedom 
of movement right must be interpreted strictly, the Commission could 
have, in theory, brought infringement procedures against Member States 
  
 222. See, e.g., Poland Accession, supra note 211, at Annex XII, ¶ 7. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Commission Decision 2012/831 of 20 December 2012 authorising Spain to 
extend the temporary suspension of the application of Articles 1 to 6 of Regulation (EU) 
No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Union with regard to Romanian workers, 2012 O.J. (L 356) 90, ¶1–3 
[hereinafter Spanish Suspension of Romanian Workers]. 
 225. Report from the Commission to the Council on the Functioning of the 
Transitional Arrangements on Free Movement of Workers from Bulgaria and Romania, 
at 4, COM (2011) 729 final (Nov. 11, 2011).  
 226. Spanish Suspension of Romanian Workers, supra note 224, at ¶¶ 4–6.  
 227. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 45, art. 18. “Every citizen of the Union shall have the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it 
effect.” Id. 
 228. See Joined Cases 31/86 and 35/86, Levantina Agrícola Indus. SA v. Council 
of the European Cmtys. 1988 E.C.R. 2285, 2317. 
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for imposing measures that were overly-broad.229 No such procedures 
were initiated. 
Although transitional mobility derogations did not apply to persons 
other than workers, CEE nationals’ access to mobility was severely 
impeded by them. Transitional restrictions did not apply to economically 
inactive individuals as long as they could demonstrate financial self-
sufficiency and health insurance coverage.230 These conditions likely 
served as a significant impediment for CEE nationals due to CEE states’ 
lower GDPs.231 Transitional mobility derogations also did not apply to 
self-employed persons.232 Although legally not a very onerous standard 
to satisfy, as discussed above, becoming self-employed requires financial 
resources and familiarity with local markets.233 These hurdles would have 
been difficult for CEE nationals to overcome. Moreover, transitional 
measures also did not apply to CEE nationals who had already been 
working lawfully in EU-15 States for an uninterrupted period of at least 
twelve months prior to accession, as long as they did not move to another 
Member State within the first twelve months after accession.234 The 
rights of such workers, however, could be limited at the discretion of the 
receiving States.235 This provision carried little practical significance 
  
 229. See Report on the First Phase (1 January 2007 – 31 December 2008) of the 
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2005 Accession Treaty and as Requested 
According to the Transitional Arrangement set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, at 4, 
COM (2008) 765 final (Nov. 18, 2008), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0765&from=EN. 
 230. See supra Part II. Commonly known as “sickness insurance” in the EU. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., GDP and household accounts at regional level, EUROSTAT (Mar. 
26, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Archive:GDP_and_ 
household_accounts_at_regional_level&oldid=81499. 
 232. Commission report on transitional arrangements regarding free movement of 
workers form Croatia, (May 29, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5068_en.htm. Transitional restrictions also did not apply to posted workers, who were 
governed by a separate legal regime. Id. 
 233. See supra Part II. 
 234. Michael Dougan, A Spectre is Haunting Europe … Free Movement of 
Persons and the Eastern Enlargement, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 111, 
123 (Christophe Hillion ed. 2004). 
 235. See generally HM Revenue & Customs, Claimant Compliance Manual, 
GOV.UK (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/claimant-
compliance-manual/ccm20110.  For example, pursuant to the UK’s Worker Registration 
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given how few CEE nationals had access to lawful employment 
opportunities before the Enlargement and their propensity to engage in 
short-term migration236 and informal employment,237 which caused them 
to lack an uninterrupted twelve-month period of employment.  
2. Access to Social Benefits After 2004 
 
a. Workers  
From day one of qualifying as a “worker” in a receiving State, access 
to that State’s social security benefits,238 social and tax advantages,239 and 
social assistance240 followed. The ECJ continued to support workers’ 
receipt of all these benefits. Drawing on Grzelczyk, in Trojani, the Court 
pointed out that a worker’s receipt of social assistance could not 
automatically lead to removal due to termination of the right to 
residence.241 In Hartmann, the Court expanded the term “worker” to 
include frontier workers, for the purposes of social advantages.
 242 
  
Scheme, CEE movers would lose their right to residence in the UK if they ceased being 
employed within the first twelve months of accession and failed to obtain new 
employment within 30 days. Id. 
 236. Helen Stalford, The Impact of Enlargement on Free Movement: A Critique of 
Transitional Periods, at 4, Third Meeting of the UACES Study Group on the Evolving 
EU Migration Law and Policy, Univ. of Liverpool (Dec. 05, 2003), 
https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/ewc/docs/Stalford-paper11.2003.pdf. 
 237. See Kubal, supra note 26, at 184. 
 238. Commission Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of April 29, 2004, on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, 2004 O.J. (L 
166), 1, 3, art. 3 (EC). These are contributory benefits, including old-age pensions, 
survivor’s pensions, disability benefits, sickness benefits, birth grants, unemployment 
benefits, family allowances, and healthcare benefits; and SNCBs (mixed type of benefits, 
between social assistance and social security), such as income support in the UK or 
jobseeker’s allowance in Ireland. Id. Non-contributory benefits fall outside EU law’s 
scope. Id. Regulation 883/2004 replaced Regulation 1408/71, continuing its general 
framework. Id. at 8, para. 44. 
 239. Regulation 1612/68, supra note 97, art. 7(2). 
 240. Directive 2004/38, supra note 177, art. 24(2). 
 241. Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles, 2004 
E.C.R. I-7573, I-7611. 
 242. Case C-212/05, Hartmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2007 E.C.R. I-6303, I-6341-
42. 
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Finally, in Renneberg, a national rule not allowing workers to offset tax 
income from one State with tax loss from another State was found 
impermissible under the Treaty’s guarantee of freedom of movement. 243 
b. Economically Inactive Movers (Including First-Time 
Jobseekers)  
Drawing support from the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions on EU 
citizenship and equality, the ECJ has continued to expand the rights of 
jobseekers and economically inactive mobile EU citizens, thus 
overcoming some of the distinctions between economically active and 
inactive movers under secondary legislation. Under the Directive, after 
the first three months of residence (during which host States could deny 
access to social assistance benefits), economically inactive movers were 
granted equal access to social assistance as long as they could 
demonstrate self-sufficiency so that they did not lose their right to 
reside.244 The Court in Trojani, however, expanded this right.245 It noted 
that since the right to reside in other Member States is conferred directly 
on every EU citizen by the Treaty, all mobile individuals are entitled to 
receive social assistance (non-contributory benefits) on the same 
conditions as host State nationals, even if they do not satisfy residence 
requirements under secondary legislation.246 Due to financial solidarity 
between all EU citizens, lacking sufficient resources was found not to 
prevent mobile persons from having access to all rights stemming from 
EU citizenship, including the right to equality in access to social 
assistance.247  
Although pursuant to Article 24(2) of the Directive, Member States 
were permitted not to grant first-time jobseekers from other Member 
States any social assistance for as long as they remained in that status, 
the ECJ mandated that they be given equal access to unemployment 
  
 243. Case C-527/06, Renneberg v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2008 E.C.R. I-
7735, I-7780, I-7790. 
 244. Directive 2004/38, supra note 177, art. 24. 
 245. Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles, 2004 
E.C.R. I-7573, I-7608, I-7610-11.  
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. 
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social assistance and other financial benefits “intended to facilitate 
access to the labour market.”248 Which specific national benefits 
“facilitate” labor market access depends on the benefits’ results, rather 
than their formal structure.249 Member States could require prospective 
workers to demonstrate a “real link” with the host country’s labor market 
to access such benefits.250 This could be satisfied where a jobseeker had 
genuinely sought work for a reasonable time period and had a “genuine 
chance[]” of finding employment.251 This test was to be broad and 
flexible, not met only when it was inconceivable that a jobseeker could 
establish a real link.252 Thus, for example, in Ioannidis, a single 
requirement based on the place where a jobseeker had completed 
secondary education was found too general and restrictive to serve as a 
test of “real link.”253 More recently, the ECJ has pointed out that 
genuinely having sought work (as demonstrated, for example, by being 
invited to job interviews, registering with employment agencies, and 
participating in their events) for a reasonable period, even without having 
ever worked in the host State, suffices.254 Any residence conditions such 
as the “genuine link” test must be applied under the principle of 
proportionality.255 Thus, in its statutory interpretation, the ECJ had 
protected jobseekers the most among all types of movers deemed to be 
economically inactive.256 However, the test also endorses implicit 
  
 248. Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze v. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nürnberg 900, 2009 E.C.R. I-4585, I-4625-26. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Case C-138/02, Collins v. Collins v. Sec’y of State for Work and 
Pensions, 2004 E.C.R. I-2703, I-2747; see also Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras 
and Koupatantze v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nürnberg 900, 2009 E.C.R. I-4585, I-4615. 
 252. See Case C-258/04, Office national de l’emploi v. Ioannidis, 2005 E.C.R. I-
8275, I-8302-04.  
 253. Id. at I-8303. 
 254. Case C-367/11, Prete v. Office national de l’emploi, 2012 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 46. 
 255. See Case C-138/02, Collins v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, 2004 
E.C.R. I-2703, I-2749, I-2754-55. 
 256. Case C-367/11, Prete v. Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2012-10 E.C.R. 1. 
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discrimination of EU movers as opposed to domestic workers, since the 
latter automatically tend to have links with their home States.257 
Social and tax advantages were not available to jobseekers under 
Regulation 1612/68. However, in Collins, the ECJ ruled that only first-
time jobseekers were excluded from access to social advantages, whereas 
those who had already entered the labor market were eligible for the 
same social and tax advantages (such as unemployment benefits) as 
national workers.258 Since jobseekers fell within Treaty provisions on 
free movement of workers, they were to be afforded equal treatment, 
including access to financial benefits for the unemployed.259 The Court 
also noted that although EU law did not preclude national legislation that 
makes entitlement to unemployment benefits conditional on a residence 
requirement, it had to satisfy the proportionality test.260 
Pursuant to Regulation 883/2004,261 special non-contributory benefits 
(SNCB)s262 were also made available to jobseekers, but only those 
deemed “habitually resident” in the host State.263 Habitual residence was 
a factual determination based on factors including the duration and 
continuity of residence, mover’s residence intentions, family status, 
housing, employment history, and tax payments.264 
  
 257. Charlotte O’Brien, Real links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The 
Relationship Between the ECJ’s ‘Real Link’ Case Law and National Solidarity, 33 EUR. 
L. REV. 643, 646, 663–64 (2008). 
 258. Case C-138/02, Collins v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, 2004 E.C.R. 
I-2703, I-2738, I-2744-45; see also Case C-258/04, Office nat’l de l’emploi v. Ioannidis, 
2005 E.C.R. I-8275, ¶¶ 21–23, 27. 
 259. See generally Case C-367/11, Prete v. Office nat’l de l’emploi, 2012-10 
E.C.R. 1. 
 260. See Case C-138/02, Collins v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, 2004 
E.C.R. I-2703, I-2749. 
 261. See Regulation 883/2004, supra note 238, art. 3, annex X. 
 262. Types of contributory social security benefits that are considered social 
assistance, including old-age pensions, survivor’s pensions, disability benefits, sickness 
benefits, birth grants, unemployment benefits, family allowances, and healthcare benefits. 
Id. art. 3. 
 263. Id. art. 1(j), art. 2. 
 264. Regulation (EC) 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
Sept. 16, 2009, Laying Down the Procedure for Implementing Regulation (EC) 883/2004 
on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, 2009 O.J. (L 284) art. 11. 
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c. CEE Nationals  
For CEE nationals lawfully residing in EU-15 States, EU law 
mandated that they have equal access to all the social benefits discussed 
above. Moreover, A-8 workers (including those self-employed) were 
entitled to equality of treatment in access to social security (both non-
contributory and contributory) under Regulation 1408/71, explicitly 
mentioned in the A-8 Accession Treaty.265  
Nothing in the Accession Treaties provided Member States the right 
to impose restrictions in addition to the mobility derogations from 
Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation 1612/68.266 Any additional restrictions 
would have been subject to the general equality principles under the 
Treaty. However, after the 2004 enlargement, all EU-15 States other than 
Sweden adopted new restrictions, for up to seven years, on post-2004 
CEE movers’ access to social assistance, social security benefits, or 
social advantages, including delays in providing such access even once 
labor market access was granted.267 Similar restrictions were applied after 
the 2007 enlargement.268 
The Commission brought infringement proceedings against the UK269  
for applying a new habitual residence test to bar not only jobseekers but 
also unemployed persons from eligibility for social security benefits and 
social advantages for the first twelve months of employment even if they 
  
 265. Poland Accession, supra note 211, at Annex II, ¶ 2(B)(2); see, e.g., id. at 
Annex II, 2(A)(1). Austria was excluded from this obligation. Id.  
 266. See generally NICOLA ROGERS & RICK SCANNELL, FREE MOVEMENT OF 
PERSONS IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION (2005). 
 267. For example, under the Worker Registration Scheme in the UK, CEE workers 
did not have right of residence (and hence no access to benefits) until they completed 
twelve months of consecutive employment. Worker Registration Scheme, UK BORDER 
AGENCY (archived Sept. 11, 2008), 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080911095157/http://www.ukba.homeoffic
e.gov.uk/workingintheuk/eea/wrs/. 
 268. See, e.g., Pamela Fitzpatrick, Benefit rights for Bulgarian and Romanian 
nationals, CHILD POVERTY ACTION GROUP (Feb. 2007), 
http://cpag.org.uk/content/benefit-rights-bulgarian-and-romanian-nationals. 
 269. The Commission also initiated infringement procedures against Austria, 
Germany, and Sweden, focusing on transitional limitations on the rights of CEE movers’ 
family members. 
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had retained worker status under EU law.270 The ECJ dismissed the case, 
however, after finding the UK approach proportionate (due to being 
based on individual assessments) and tied to a legitimate need to protect 
public finances.271 This was one of the earliest indications of the ECJ’s 
becoming more responsive to Member States’ arguments about CEE 
nationals’ alleged welfare tourism.  
C.  Legal Regime Since Transitional Mobility Derogations Had 
Expired  
1. Freedom of Movement Law  
Directive 2004/38 continues to be in force today, connecting the 
rights of residence, mobility, and social assistance benefits.272 In the last 
few years, there have been no changes in EU institutions’ approach 
toward the Directive’s basic principles on free movement and residence 
rights, except for the ECJ’s imposition of limitations on residence rights 
of economically inactive movers.273  
a. Workers 
Regulation 492/2011 replaced Regulation 1612/68 to mandate 
equality of mobile workers and jobseekers in the context of employment, 
including social and tax advantages.274 Adopted to improve application of 
Regulation 492/2011, Directive 2014/54 calls on Member States to 
strengthen redress mechanisms for workers suffering discrimination or 
infringement of their right to free movement275 and to designate bodies to 
  
 270. Case C-308/14, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2016 E.C.R. 1, 8-9. 
 271. Id. at 16. 
 272. See generally Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 177. 
 273. See infra Part II C 1(b). 
 274. Regulation 492/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 2011 on Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Union, art. 7(2), 2011 O.J. 
(L 141) 3 (EU). 
 275. Directive 2014/54/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the 
context of freedom of movement for workers, art. 3(1), 2014 O.J (L128) 12 (EU). 
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support equal treatment of EU workers and their families.276 These recent 
laws expanded the EU’s conceptual approach to mobility: Regulation 
492/2011 defines the right to free movement as including “all matters 
relating to the actual pursuit of activities as employed persons,” as well 
as “conditions for the integration of the worker’s family,”277 and 
Directive 2014/54 denounces any “unjustified restrictions and obstacles” 
to mobility.278 
The ECJ continues to define the concept of “worker” broadly. For 
example, in Saint-Prix, the Court extended worker status to a woman 
who had stopped working due to late stages of pregnancy and the effects 
of childbirth as long as she would return to work within a “reasonable” 
time (to be determined based on specific factual circumstances).279 
Moreover, the Court noted that Directive 2004/38 cannot limit the scope 
of “worker” status under the Treaty.280 In its L.N. decision, Case C-46/12, 
relying on the Treaty, the ECJ ruled that motivations for undertaking 
work abroad are irrelevant to the definition of “worker.”281 Thus, the 
Court allowed a full-time student employed part-time to have worker 
status, despite the fact that he might have entered the host State with the 
intention to study rather than to work.282 Moreover, in Gusa, the Court 
ruled that self-employed movers can retain their worker status and hence 
their right to reside under Directive 2004/38 (and thus be eligible for 
social benefits such as jobseekers’ allowance).283  
Notably, the Gusa decision focused on how the claimant was 
deserving of access to social benefits due to having worked and paid 
taxes in the host State for four years and having relied on his family 
(rather than the public purse) for financial support upon his arrival in the 
  
 276. Id. art. 4. 
 277. Regulation 492/2011, supra note 274, at Recital (6). 
 278. Directive 2014/54, supra note 275, at art. 3. 
 279. Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, 
2014 E.C.R. 1, 8.  
 280. See id. at 5. 
 281. Case C-46/12, L. N. v. Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og 
Uddannelsesstøtte, 2013 E.C.R. 1, 9. 
 282. See id. at 10. 
 283. Case C-442/16, Florea Gusa v Minister for Soc. Protection, Ireland, Attorney 
Gen., 2017 EUR-Lex 1004, ¶ 43–46 (Dec. 20, 2017) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62016CJ0442&from=GA. 
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host States.284 Unlike in its older decisions, the Court did not refer to 
Treaty rights, and instead focused on market citizenship.285 Coutts (2018) 
notes how the Gusa decision places the responsibility for integration on 
movers themselves, and equates it with economic participation.286 
Moreover, the decision adds a qualitative test to determining whether 
economic activity is sufficient to warrant access to EU rights.287 This, of 
course, not only departs from statutory provisions, but also introduces a 
subjective, individualised approach to judicial interpretation. 
Transitional mobility restrictions were imposed on workers from 
Croatia after its accession in 2013.288 Moreover, any future accession 
treaties have been predicted to include permanent labor mobility 
safeguards.289 As stated by the Council President in the Conclusions of 
the European Council summit held in 2016, any future enlargements will 
include “appropriate transitional measures concerning free movement of 
persons.”290 The Commission did not express a view on this approach.291 
b. Economically Inactive Persons (Including Jobseekers)  
In the last few years, the ECJ has been reading secondary legislation 
narrowly, rather than interpreting Treaty provisions expansively, to limit 
residence rights of economically inactive movers. In Brey, the Court 
suggested that an economically inactive mover’s entitlement to a means-
tested SNCB benefit (such as compensatory supplement benefit) could 
be an indication of not having sufficient resources.292 Thus, such person’s 
right to residence under Directive 2004/38 for longer than three months 
  
 284. Id. at ¶ 5, 44–46. 
 285. See id. at 10. 
 286. Stephen Coutts, The Absence of Integration and the Responsibilisation of 
Union Citizenship, 3 EUR. PAPERS 761, 770–71 (Oct. 26, 2018). 
 287. Id. at 772. 
 288. Commission report on transitional arrangements regarding free movement of 
workers form Croatia, supra note 232. 
 289. Editorial Board, The Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: 
Salvaging the Dream while Explaining the Nightmare, 51 COMMON MKT L. REV. 729, 
730 (2014). 
 290. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Feb. 19, 2016), at 24. 
 291. See generally, id. 
 292. Case C‑140/12, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v. Peter Brey, 2013 E.C.R. 1, 
16. 
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could be in question, to be determined through an individual 
examination. After Dano, however, economically inactive individuals’ 
application for social assistance benefits results in losing their right to 
reside due to lacking sufficient resources.293 Moreover, Member States 
do not have to provide access to SNCBs to economically inactive EU 
citizens - at least to those who, like Ms Dano, had never been employed 
in the receiving State, and were not searching for work.
294
 Thus, despite 
fundamental EU citizenship rights, in practice, Member States may 
attach conditions of residence from Directive 2004/38 to the provision of 
SNCBs with a social assistance component, thus limiting access to them 
even if they are available under Regulation 883/2004.  
Notably, similar to its decision in Gusa (discussed earlier), the Court 
in Dano engaged in a subjective discussion of the claimant’s personal 
circumstances which were not relevant to the legal question before it.295 
For example, it mentioned how the claimant had been receiving public 
support for her child “whose father’s identity is not known,”296 lacked 
any educational certificates or professional training, could not write in in 
the host State’s language, had never worked, and had not provided 
evidence of having looked for work297. Thereby, the ECJ created the 
impression of someone who does not deserve protections of EU law. 
c. CEE Nationals  
The above provisions fully apply to CEE nationals since transitional 
mobility restrictions have come to an end. Given that CEE nationals’ 
mobility has been primarily motivated by employment opportunities in 
EU-15 States, measures that have decreased jobseekers’ rights have been 
especially detrimental to their enjoyment of the free movement right. EU 
institutions’ prioritizing worker status has likely put pressure on 
jobseekers to take up any available employment options, including those 
in flexible arrangements. To support CEE nationals’ residence rights in 
  
 293. Case C-333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, 2014 E.C.R. 1, 12, 16, 17. 
 294. Id. at 15–16. 
 295. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 39 (considering Ms. Dano’s ability to read and write); id. at 
¶ 38 (noting that the identity of the father of Ms. Dano’s child is unknown). Such details 
would have been relevant to proportionality analysis, which was not applicable in Dano. 
 296. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 297. Id. at ¶ 39. 
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host States, the ECJ has ruled that their periods of lawful residence in 
EU-15 States before the Eastern Enlargement must be taken into account 
for the purpose of acquisition of permanent residence.298 
2. Access to Social Benefits Since 2014  
In the last few years, there have been no statutory changes in 
provisions on mobile persons’ access to social benefits. Directive 
2004/38 continues to govern access to social assistance, and Regulation 
883/2004 dictates the coordination of workers’ access to social security 
benefits.299 Regulation 492/2011 replaced Regulation 1612/68 without 
changing its provisions on workers’ access to social and tax 
advantages.300 The ECJ, however, has limited economically inactive 
movers’ access to benefits. 
a. Workers  
As stated in the Conclusions of the European Council summit in 2016, 
the ECJ opposes restricting economically-active movers’ rights to social 
assistance.301 In addition to continuing to define the concept of “worker” 
broadly, as discussed above, the ECJ has been strengthening workers’ 
access to social assistance. For example, in Saint-Prix, the Court 
recognized entitlement to income support (a type of SNCB) of a woman 
who had stopped working due to pregnancy and childbirth.302  
The Council and the Commission, however, have been more 
responsive to Member States’ concerns about limiting access to social 
benefits, even of workers. This became especially evident during David 
Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s membership in the EU. Essentially, 
  
 298. Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, Ziolkowski and Szeja v. Land Berlin, 
2011 E.C.R. I-14035, I-14079. 
 299. See generally Directive 2004/38, supra note 177; Regulation 883/2004, supra 
note 238. 
 300. Regulation 492/2011, supra note 274, at art. 7(2). 
 301. A New Settlement for The United Kingdom Within the European Union: 
Extract of the conclusions of the European Council of 18-19 February 2016, Annex I 
Section D, 2016 O.J. (C 69) I/01. 
 302. See Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v. v. Sec’y of State for Work and 
Pensions, 2014 E.C.R. 1, 8. 
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Cameron was seeking to extend the application of Dano and Alimanovic 
to reduce workers’ access to social security. According to the Council, 
“Member States have the right to define the fundamental principles of 
their social security systems and enjoy a broad margin of discretion to 
define and implement their social and employment policy, including 
setting the conditions for access to welfare benefits.”303 To facilitate 
granting States greater discretion, the Council declared its intention to 
submit proposals to amend secondary legislation, including Regulation 
883/2004 (on the coordination of social security systems) so child 
benefits claims could be indexed by host States to benefits levels in the 
place of child’s residence; and Regulation 492/2011, to provide an “alert 
and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of inflow of 
workers from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an 
extended period of time, including as a result of past policies following 
previous EU enlargements.”304 The only limitation would be that EU 
workers must not be treated less favorably than TCNs.305  The 
Commission was in support of these proposals.306  
Although these Conclusions were reached in the context of the UK’s 
renegotiation of its membership, due to what the Commission had 
acknowledged to be conditions of necessity brought about by large influx 
of movers into the UK, they nevertheless indicate EU institutions’ 
openness toward prioritizing EU-15 States’ concerns and limiting even 
workers’ access to benefits. Critically, it is not clear what evidence the 
UK had presented to warrant such conclusions, which are incompatible 
with free movement and anti-discrimination provisions of EU law. The 
Commission simply declared “that the kind of information provided to it 
by the [UK]” showed “the type of exceptional situation that the proposed 
safeguard mechanism is intended to cover exists in the United Kingdom 
today.”307 This is despite having concluded in 2013 that there was little 
evidence of benefit tourism across the EU, but only evidence of 
  
 303. Presidential Conclusions, supra note 290, at 19. 
 304. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 33–34. 
 307. Id. at 34. 
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economic benefits to the receiving States, especially the UK.308 Thus, it is 
likely that both the Commission and the Council subscribe to one of the 
key misconceptions about the effects of free movement—that it 
negatively affects host States’ public purse. 
b. Economically Inactive Persons (Including Jobseekers)  
Whereas in the late 1990s and early 2000s the ECJ had been 
providing economically inactive EU citizens with access to some social 
benefits not accessible under secondary legislation, the Court has been 
retracting on this approach in the last few years. Having become more 
sensitive to EU-15 States’ concerns about benefit tourism, the Court has 
been narrowly reading secondary legislation rather than relying on 
Treaty provisions. After Dano, Member States do not have to provide 
access to SNCBs to economically inactive EU citizens (or at least those 
who, like the petitioner, had never been employed in the receiving States 
and were not searching for work).309 Moreover, those who apply for 
social assistance benefits lose their right to reside, without the need for 
an individual assessment.310 Thus, in practice, economically inactive 
persons lack the right to equal treatment in the provision of social 
assistance. Despite fundamental rights stemming from EU citizenship, 
Member States may attach conditions of residence from Directive 
2004/38 to the provision of SNCBs with a social assistance component, 
and thus exclude access to them even if they are available under 
Regulation 883/2004.  
Despite the Commission’s obvious opposition, in Commission v. 
United Kingdom, the ECJ extended Dano’s exclusion of SNCBs to all 
social security benefits (including family benefits), not just those with a 
social assistance element.311 The ECJ imported Dano’s approach of not 
requiring an individual assessment and Brey’s principle of permitting 
  
 308. Carmen Jurvale et. al, A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member 
States’ social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to 
special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence, 
at 176-77 (Oct. 14, 2013). 
 309. See Case C-333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, 2014 E.C.R. 1, 17. 
 310. Case C-333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, 2014 E.C.R. 1, 12, 16, 78. 
 311. See Case C-308/14, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2016 E.C.R. 1, 2, 8. 
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Member States to impose conditions (such as the UK’s right-to-reside 
requirements) on economically inactive persons to be eligible for SNCBs 
into Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004 (regarding equality of treatment in 
the receipt of social security benefits, such as child benefits and child tax 
credits).312 Moreover, the Court reversed its prior approach regarding 
burden of proof, so Member States are now presumed to be acting in a 
lawful non-discriminatory manner in denying access to social benefits as 
long as they justify their actions based on protecting their public 
finances.313   
The ECJ also narrowed the scope of fundamental Treaty principles by 
applying secondary EU legislation limitations in Alimanovic,314 an even 
stricter application of Directive 2004/38 than Dano. Despite research 
evidence to the contrary, the Court in Alimanovic accepted EU-15 States’ 
“welfare magnet” argument and concluded that even if individual social 
assistance claims did not place an “unreasonable burden” on national 
social security systems, Member States could argue that accumulated 
claims would do so.315 Thus, States were entitled to prevent mobile 
jobseekers’ access to certain SNCBs (which constitute social assistance 
under Directive 2004/38, but are not benefits of financial nature intended 
to facilitate access to the labor market). Moreover, although Article 7(3) 
of Directive 2004/38 allowed former workers to retain their status for six 
months after becoming unemployed,316 the ECJ concluded that after that 
period, they could claim social assistance only if their right of residence 
was based on more than the non-expulsion provision of Article 14(4) 
(continuing to seek employment).317  
The Court in Alimanovic also narrowly construed the “intended to 
facilitate access to the labour market” test, so that only benefits that are 
necessary to jobseekers’ ability to access the labor market fall outside the 
  
 312. Regulation 883/2004, supra note 238, art. 4. 
 313. See Case C-308/14, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2016 E.C.R. 1, 15. 
 314. Case C-67/14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v. Alimanovic, 2015 E.C.R. 1, 6. 
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scope of Article 24(2), and thus cannot be withheld during the first three 
months of residence or to first-time jobseekers.318 Moreover, the Court 
ruled that expulsion decisions due to presenting an unreasonable burden 
on a national social assistance system did not require individual 
assessments.319 This stance was reiterated in Garcia-Nieto, in which the 
ECJ held that jobseekers never have access to unemployment benefits 
even if they facilitate access to the labor market because such benefits 
have a social assistance element – that is, their primary aim is the 
preservation of dignity, rather than facilitation of access to the labor 
market.320 Consequently, jobseekers can be automatically excluded from 
access to social assistance, even in the first three months of residence. 
c. CEE Nationals  
In the last few years, as discussed above, the ECJ has reduced the 
access of economically inactive movers to benefits, and other EU 
branches have considered diminishing even workers’ access in response 
to EU-15 concerns about alleged welfare tourism. Such measures have 
likely had more impact on movers who are poor or not employable as 
highly-skilled workers in the receiving States. Jobseeker limitations on 
access to social benefits especially impact CEE nationals since they have 
access to fewer financial resources than EU-15 nationals and tend to be 
employed in temporary, flexible, and semi-legal arrangements.321 
III.     CONCLUSION  
The UK’s Brexit referendum has exposed immigration and free 
movement debates to wider public, political, and media scrutiny, 
oftentimes filled with inaccurate or misleading statements. Such 
erroneous myths have vilified movers, degraded their ability to integrate 
in host Member States, and increased strife between locals and movers. 
Although not often mentioned in those debates, the UK has been 
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 319. Id. at 14. 
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chipping away at the right to mobility for decades through not belonging 
to the Schengen area, various immigration opt-outs, and the imposition 
of indirect transitional mobility derogations after the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements.322 What also has been lacking from debates is how the EU 
has been approaching the right to free movement, and what limits on 
mobility it has accepted. In order for Brexit negotiations to be more 
responsive to the reality of mobility, for the public to understand this 
right and the aftermath of Brexit, and for improved future contestations 
over immigration in other Member States, it is important that politicians 
and the media address immigration more responsibly, and that the 
evolution of the right to free movement is understood correctly. 
As discussed in this Article, although originally limited to workers, by 
the 1990s, the free movement right was gradually expanded via Treaty 
provisions, statutes, and ECJ decisions to beyond what is necessary for 
the functioning of the single market to encompass former workers, 
jobseekers, and eventually all EU-15 citizens.323 Relying heavily on the 
post-Maastricht concept of EU citizenship as not linked to the market 
economy, the ECJ also expanded access to residence rights and social 
benefits to economically inactive EU-15 nationals, going beyond 
limitations imposed by secondary laws.324 As both legislation and ECJ 
decisions shifted the focus from the concept of economically active 
participants in the single market to EU citizenship, even economically 
inactive EU-15 nationals gained access to equal treatment and integration 
measures.325  
While EU-15 nationals’ access to free movement and to social 
benefits was being expanded, CEE nationals’ ability to enter EU-15 
States was very restricted. Before the Eastern Enlargement, CEE 
nationals’ mobility was limited to bilateral agreements that provided for 
movement of small numbers of workers to satisfy specific economic 
needs in EU-15 States.326 The Europe Agreements did not facilitate 
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 323. See supra Part II Section A. 
 324. See supra Part II Section A.1.b, B.2.c. 
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 326. See supra Part II Section A.1.c, A.2.c. 
2019] Retracing the Right to Free Movement 433
  
mobility, and their right to equal treatment in the employment context 
applied to very few categories of CEE workers.327 The abolition of the 
requirement for entry visas to EU-15 States in 2001 led to a de facto 
influx of CEE labor migrants.328 As TCNs, CEE nationals were not 
entitled mobility protections or access to social benefits in EU-15 States. 
Despite an overall expansion of protections of free movement and 
residence rights, statutory differentiation between the rights of workers 
and of economically inactive citizens continued after 2004.329 The rights 
of workers, former workers, and jobseekers were getting increased 
protections through both statutes and ECJ decisions.330 Due to 
transitional post-accession derogations, EU-15 Member States could 
permit only EU-15 nationals to enter their labor markets for the first 
seven years after the Eastern Enlargement.331 During that time, EU-15 
States could exclude CEE workers and jobseekers, and hence treat them 
akin to TCNs. Continuing its trend from before 2004, the ECJ relied on 
Treaty provisions to also expand rights of economically inactive citizens, 
once again going beyond statutory limitations.332 The European 
Parliament was supportive of this approach.333 Although CEE nationals 
who were self-employed or economically inactive were granted the same 
EU rights as mobile EU-15 nationals, in practice, few were able to 
benefit from such rights due to financial constraints.334  
Since transitional arrangements have come to an end, CEE nationals 
have benefited from increasingly expanding statutory and ECJ 
protections of workers’ residence and social benefits rights. All EU 
institutions appear to have become more responsive, however, to EU-15 
States’ concerns about welfare tourism by CEE nationals. Starting with 
Dano in 2014 (the same year that transitional limitations on A-2 workers 
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and jobseekers’ mobility had come to an end),335 the ECJ broke from its 
precedent and began to diminish residence rights and access to social 
benefits of jobseekers and economically inactive individuals by narrowly 
applying secondary laws.336 References to Treaty provisions, EU 
citizenship rights, or financial solidarity—which had permeated pre-
Dano case law—are no longer part of the ECJ’s decisions. Consequently, 
CEE jobseekers and economically inactive movers337 are facing 
increasing impediments. The reasoning and outcomes in these recent 
cases indicate that EU citizenship depends on participation in the market, 
so that poor and economically inactive EU citizens do not enjoy the same 
rights as those who are employed or have resources.338  
Current mobility laws discourage movement of jobseekers and those 
who lack access to financial resources. By privileging worker status, the 
current legal framework reduces worker autonomy as it likely 
encourages efforts to obtain employment soon upon arrival in host States 
or even before and thus increases reliance on employment agencies and 
willingness to accept temporary or flexible work arrangements. It also 
negatively affects workers who become unemployed, especially those 
who are poor. Recent impediments in economically inactive movers’ 
access to social benefits are likely to have greater impact on CEE than 
EU-15 mobile nationals due to the formers’ propensity to engage in 
irregular, poorly paid employment, more recent labor market access in 
EU-15 States, and lesser access to financial resources from home.339 By 
providing Member States with discretion to withhold equal access to 
social benefits without terminating residence rights, the ECJ has created 
a class of economically inactive EU citizens who cannot be expelled but 
have no entitlement to social assistance.340 Moreover, Member States 
have been provided discretion to define worker status narrowly, thus 
leading to withholding benefits from workers with low incomes and 
inflexible, insecure work arrangements, which is more and more 
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prevalent in today’s economies.341 The EU has not acknowledged today’s 
labor market patterns in its legal framework. Because immigrants, 
especially those from poorer states, tend to concentrate in low-pay, less 
secure jobs, they have been especially impacted. Since the economic 
crisis of 2008, part-time, flexible, and insecure employment options have 
proliferated in the EU,342 and inequalities have been increasing across the 
EU.343 Precarious employment, very often undertaken by CEE workers in 
EU-15 States, becomes even more precarious as a result of the increasing 
divergence between EU rhetoric and EU rights, which is further 
weakened due to Member State discretion.344 This has had an especially 
negative impact on CEE workers. For example, the imposition of the 
UK’s post-accession Worker Registration Scheme has been shown to 
have made CEE workers especially susceptible to forced labor.345 Such 
effects were likely amplified in the twelve EU-15 States that had 
imposed direct post-accession mobility restrictions on CEE nationals. 
O’Brien has called this “a triumph of capitalist reasoning[:]” the 
“creation of a non-national working poor” class, responsive to labor 
market fluctuations, yet with few entitlements to the public purse. 346  
Ultimately, this will have consequences for all low-skill workers, foreign 
and local, by increasing socio-economic inequalities, and increasing 
resultant social costs—homelessness, poor health, increased crime, and 
decreased social cohesion and trust.  
Perhaps it is thus not surprising that EU institutions’ praise of 
mobility has often been tied to economic benefits rather than to values 
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such as human dignity. Functioning as “one and undivided economic 
workforce,” “European citizens should ‘move’ because their ‘movement’ 
prospers the development of ‘human resources’ and the ‘Single 
Market.’”347 Having praised the free movement right for creating a “more 
efficient allocation of resources” and “more integrated labour markets . . 
. better able to adjust to asymmetric shocks,”348 the Commission 
acknowledged that its support of workers’ equality was grounded in 
improving overall economic success of the EU rather than in respect for 
human dignity.349 The European Parliament and the Council have also 
pointed out economic benefits of intra-EU mobility, linking it to the 
“proper functioning of the internal market”350 by “helping to satisfy the 
requirements of the economies of the Member States.”351 Such rhetoric 
regarding the free movement right is in line with this article’s  analysis of 
secondary laws, which still retains an economic core despite having been 
expanded to non-economically active persons. Given that intra-EU 
mobility has been primarily from CEE to EU-15 States since the Eastern 
Enlargement, it is EU-15 States’ economies that have been emphasized 
and protected. 
Similarly, EU discourse regarding post-accession mobility 
derogations has focused on economic benefits accruing to EU-15 States. 
Although EU institutions were less enthusiastic about applying 
transitional measures than some EU-15 States were, they rarely 
acknowledged any conceptual or legal difficulties with the derogations. 
Instead, the Commission has tended to frame its critique in economic 
terms only, finding transitional measures unnecessary for ensuring EU-
15 States’ economic interests, particularly in light of predictions of low 
CEE post-accession mobility.352 Moreover, mobility restrictions were 
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disfavored because they were likely to hinder the functioning of the 
internal market.353 After the Enlargement, the Commission continued to 
question the necessity of imposing transitional measures, but again, its 
critique focused on economic benefits to EU-15 States of unlimited 
mobility.354 On occasion, the Commission even defended direct 
transitional mobility limitations—albeit in economic terms only (for 
allegedly benefiting CEE States by better allocating labor).355  
As discussed in this Article, freedom of movement has never been an 
absolute right. Although expanded via secondary laws and especially 
ECJ decisions relying on Treaty provisions, the right has always 
differentiated between economically active movers and those with 
financial resources, as opposed to economically inactive and poor ones. 
Benefiting the economies of the host, that is, EU-15 States, has been 
prioritized over mobility rights of CEE nationals. Moreover, the complex 
web of EU law on social benefits has intersected with freedom of 
movement laws to further privilege EU-15 States’ economic interests, 
which has also been reflected in EU rhetoric: “at the heart of the EU 
project lies a preoccupation with the mobility and residence rights of 
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workers rather than citizens per se.”356 This article argues that this 
mobility has always been structured—and, as needed, undermined by the 
EU—in the service of EU-15 Member States’ economic and political 
concerns. Although CEE nationals (and CEE states) have benefited in 
numerous ways from the Eastern Enlargement, such benefits appear 
ancillary. This brings to mind Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory, 
which, although based on black-white relations in the United States,357  
can be expanded to encompass all dominant groups’ promotion of legal 
or social advances for groups with less power only when such advances 
also promote their own self-interest.  
Whereas mainstream CRT scholars postulate a view of racial relations 
and power differentials between whites and non-whites, some CWS 
scholars have noted the need for a more nuanced look at fractures and 
hierarchies within whiteness. 358  This article’s analysis of the policy of 
mobility indicates that CEE nationals have straddled belonging and 
exclusion from the bundle of rights that accrues from EU citizenship, 
pointing to a hierarchy of Europeanness, citizenship, and whiteness 
within the EU. Immigrants stand at the intersection of various binaries of 
privilege and subordination, and thus, the need for adding more nuances 
to critical approaches to the study of law, race, and power. By testing and 
critiquing limitations of CRT and CWS, this article hopes to reinvigorate 
critical approaches to the study of law. Moreover, through the 
exploration of the internal boundaries of whiteness, I expose its 
fabrication, taking a step toward abolishing racism. As Justice Blackmun 
had noted in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, “[i]n order 
to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.” 359  
More generally, the analysis here demonstrates how EU institutions 
have exhibited longstanding willingness to compromise the right of free 
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movement,360 undermining trust and solidarity among EU citizenry. Their 
approach has diminished the status of and rights stemming from EU 
citizenship, challenged coherence of the EU legal order, and shown how 
malleable the concept of equality can be. This is especially problematic 
given that populist parties in several other EU-15 States have supported 
their own versions of Cameron’s pushback against the EU.361 As O’Brien 
had noted, since national measures limiting access to mobility and social 
benefits are not supported by evidence of negative economic effects of 
mobility, they are likely driven by capitalism and nationalistic 
prejudice.362 If EU institutions were to challenge—as they should—
Member State’s attacks on mobility, they would have to begin by more 
closely matching their policies to their lofty rhetoric. 
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